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I. THE PROBLEM
All countries experience some loss of skilled manpower through
emigration The large-scale movement of skilled manpower from the
less developed countries to the developed countries, however, has
become the subject of increasing national and international concern.2
This loss of talent,3 the so-called brain drain, is deeply resented by the
I. Emigration tends to occur from relatively less developed countries to relatively
more developed countries and is, therefore, a reflection of different stages of economic
development. Because such differences have always existed, scholars suspect that this
emigration is a deeply rooted historical phenomenon. Possibly the oldest mention of this
phenomenon is the complaint by the Greek writer Athenacus of "the drain of Greek
brains to Alexandria," which referred to efforts of the Ptolemies to shift the center of
learning of the classical world from Athens to Alexandria. See Dedijer, "Early" Migration,
in Tkzm BRAIN DRAIN 9, 16 (W. Adams ed. 1968) [book hereinafter cited as ADAMs], In
the case of scientists, a group that has been unusually mobile, one commentator con-
cludes that "[flor at least the past 2,200 years people in power have been doing some-
thing about the migration of scientists: they have had policies to promote or prevent it."
Id. at io.
2. See, e.g., CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE Pop HousE Comm. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
93D CONG., 2D SEss., BRAIN DRAIN: A STUDY OF THE PERSISTENT ISSUE OF INTERNATIONAL
ScIaENFIc MOBILITY (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter cited as STUDYv]; REPORT OF rHE
SECRETARY-GENERAL, OuTFLow OF TRAINED PERSONNEL FRoma DEVELOPING COUNTRIES,
U.N. Doe. A/7294 (x968); TAsC FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION, INTERNATIONAL
EDUCATION: PAST, PRESENT, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECrs, H.R. Doc. No. 527, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1966); TAxING T E BRAIN DRAIN (J. Bhagwati & M. Partington eds. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as VOL. I]; THE BRAIN DRAIN AND TAXATION (J. Bhagwati ed. 1976)
[hereinafter cited as VOL. II]. Also see sources cited in appendix.
3. The migration of skilled manpower can also occur between two developed coun-
tries, e.g., from the United Kingdom to the United States, or between two less developed
countries, e.g., from a fourth world country to a third world country that is a member
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). For an examination of
the brain drain occurring among developing countries, see UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT [UNCTAD], CO-OPERATIVE EXCHANGE OF SKILLS AMONG
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: POLICIES FOR COLLECTIVE SELF-RELIANCE IN SKILLED MANPOW-
ER, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.4/8 (1978).
A country can experience emigration and immigration simultaneously; some of its
citizens may be emigrating to more developed nations at the same time that it is receiving
immigrants from less developed nations. The United Kingdom, for example, loses doctors
to the United States; this emigration is offset by the immigration of doctors from Pakistan
and India. Adams, Introduction, in ADAMS, supra note I, at 1, 2. Israel also experiences
both emigration and immigration, but its situation is unusual in that some of its immi-
grants are from a more developed country, the United States. See generally P. RITTERn
BANeD, EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND MIGRATION (1978). In addition to "external" migra-
tion, that is, migration to other countries, a country may experience "internal" migration.
For example, persons may migrate within a country from relatively less developed rural
areas to relatively more developed urban areas. See, e.g., F. SiOAT, CASE STUDIES IN
REVERSE TRANSFER or TECHNOLOGY (BRAIN DRAIN): A StvEY oF PROBLEMS AND POLICIES
IN THE PHILIPPINES I5, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.4/5 (1977); COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC
AND INDUSTRIAL RESEARCH OF INDIA, CASE STUDY IN REVERSE TRANSFER or TECHNOLOGY
(BRAIN DRAI): A SURVEY oF PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN INDIA Z5, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/
AC.4/6 (1977). This internal migration may be more serious for some countries than
external migration.
Although this article focuses on the brain drain from the less developed countries to
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less developed countries (LDCs) for two reasons. First, because skilled
and talented individuals, such as doctors, engineers, and scientists, are
perceived as key ingredients of growth, the less developed countries
fear that the brain drain is retarding their economic advancement.
Second, many of these countries, especially those which have only
recently terminated their colonial relationships, view the brain drain as
a form of further exploitation by the developed countries (DCs).
Instead of exploiting mineral and other natural resources, the devel-
oped countries are now accused of exploiting human resources. Indeed,
the brain drain has been referred to as "an 'odious bleeding' of Africa,
a continuation of the slave trade" 4 and an immoral process that is
"against the principles and purposes of international cooperation." 5
As these comments suggest, debate over the brain drain6 from the
LDCs to the DCs7 is frequently conducted in a highly charged atmos-
phere. Rational discussion of the causes and remedies is also impeded
by the absence of accurate, comprehensive, and uniform statistics. For
example, reliable and meaningful measures of the flow of the profes-
the developed countries, the analysis accommodates migration among developed countries
and among less developed countries. Internal migration, however, is outside the scope of
this article.
4. STUDY, supra note 2, at 7, relating remarks attributed to the Representative of
Dahomey to the United Nations General Assembly.
5. Statement of officials of the United Arab Republic's Ministry of Education, quoted in
UNESCO, PRELIMINARY REPORT ON EMIGRATION OF SCIENTISTS AND TFCHNoLoausTs 8
(1968).
6. The term "brain drain" is used in this article with reluctance; it has negative impli-
cations and seems to prejudge one of the basic issues, i.e., whether the emigration of
skilled manpower is, in fact, harmful to the less developed countries. Brain drain is, how-
ever, much more convenient stylistically than "reverse transfer of technology," the cum-
bersome expression thought by some international organizations to be more neutral in
connotation.
7. The terms "developed countries" (DCs) and "less developed countries" (LDCs)
have no single established definition, and no attempt is made in this article to formulate
a more precise definition. A country identified as an LDC on the basis of one set of
criteria may be characterized as a DC on another. The Organization for Economic Co-
Operation and Development (OECD), the United Nations Secretariat, the UNCTAD
Secretariat, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the United States all use differ-
ent criteria to define LDCs. See Reifman, Developing Countries - Definitions and Data;
Or Third World, Fourth World, OPEC, and Other Countries, in 2 STUDsas nN TAxATioN,
PUBLIC FiNAcE ANmD RELATED Su TeTs - A COMPENDIUM 483 (1978). The increasing
use of expressions such as "third world," "fourth world," and "fifth world" countries
indicates that the LDCs are no longer thought of as a homogeneous group. In fact, a third
world country may be thought of as a DC by a fourth world country. For a fourth world
country to lose manpower to a third world country may be viewed as little different in the
short term from its losing manpower to a DC. In the long term, however, emigration to a
DC is likely to be more permanent. See, e.g., MA2RGA INSTITUTE, CASE STUDIES IN REvBRsE
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (BRAIN DRAIN): A StwVY oF PROBLEMS AND POLICES IN SRI
LANKA 2, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.4/ 4 (1977).
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sional, technical, and kindred persons (PTKs),8 who are the heart of
the brain drain, are not available." A more formidable obstacle, how-
8. The International Labour Office (ILO) has defined PTKs as follows:
Workers in this major group conduct research and apply in a professional capacity
scientific knowledge and methods to a variety of technological, economic, social, in-
dustrial, and governmental problems, carry out technical tasks auxiliary to scientific
research, development and practice, and perform religious, educational, legal, artistic
and literary functions. Those classified in this major group perform tasks which
usually require training in a specific scientific or other professional field, at a univer-
sity, technical institute or similar establishment or which require creative ability in
literature or art or talent in entertaining.
INTERNATIONAL LABoUR OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL STANDARD CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPA-
TIONS 27 (1958). Variations in this definition can be found in the immigration laws of
many DCs.
For some LDCs, the brain drain may consist of businessmen, renders, international civil
servants, and employees of international organizations - persons not usually classified as
PTKs. For others, emigration may be a "muscle drain" more than a brain drain. See
section II(D) (I) infra; Ecevit & Zachariab, International Labor Migration, 15 FINANCe &
DEV. 32 (1978). The LDCs seem unaffected by the "fame drain," that is, the emigration
of actors, authors, and musicians. The fame drain is commonly associated with the United
Kingdom and is said to occur in response to its high rates of personal taxation. See Hart-
ford Courant, Sept. 25, 1977, at 9, col. z.
9. Most reports on the brain drain stress the absence of reliable statistics. STUnY, supra
note 2, at 4. In the LDCs themselves, reliable data are virtually nonexistent. One commen-
tator has described the LDC statistics as ranging from "unsatisfactory to hopeless."
Baldwin, Brain Drain or Overflow?, 48 FOREIGN AFF. 358, 359 (970). To fill this gap,
the establishment of manpower pools or data banks has been proposed. UNCTAD, supra
note 3.
The weaknesses in the data now available are numerous. First, no records are kept on
reverse migration - LDC emigrants to the DCs who subsequently return to the LDCs.
This reverse migration may be substantial. Second, immigrants are identified by their place
of residence, rather than by their country of birth or by their citizenship. For example, an
LDC PTK entering the United States from Canada is identified as a Canadian resident,
not as an LDC national. Third, the DCs fail to identify PTKs who enter as relatives of
DC residents and citizens. Fourth, there is a lack of accurate data on illegal immigrants,
a group that apparently includes some PTKs. Fifth, immigration records lack information
on the educational level of immigrants. Sixth, the DCs have not adopted uniform
definitions for their various categories of immigrants. Bhagwati, The International Brain
Drain and Taxation: Survey of the Issues, in VOL. II, supra note 2, at 3, 5-6.
One scholar summarized the lack of data as follows: "When it comes to the 'brain
drain,' there is indeed a great deal of ignorance and a real need for research." S. DLuTscsr,
INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION AND EXCHANGE: A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 31 (1970). A gov-
ernment official found it ironic that detailed statistics have been kept for decades on
shipments of coffee, steel, and cotton but not on the flow of PTKs. See International
Migration of Talent and Skills: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and
Naturalization of the Senate Comm. on Judiciary, goth Cong., ist Sess. so6 (x967)
(statement of Dr. D. Hornig, Special Ass't to the President and Director, Office of Science
and Technology) [hereinafter cited as Senate Brain Drain Hearings).
Despite these weaknesses in the data, economists have attempted to sketch the flow of
PTKs from the LDCs to the DCs. E.g., F. SicAT, supra note 3; Balacs & Gordon, The
Brain Drain and Income Taxation: The U.K., in VOL. I, supra note 2, at 7; Bhagwati &
Dellalfar, The Brain Drain and Income Taxation: The U.S., I WORaLD DaV. 94 (x973),
reprinted in VoL. I, supra note 2, at 33; DeVorets & Maki, The Brain Drain and Income
Taxation: Canada, in VOL. 1, supra note 2, at 53; Lucas, The Supply-ol-Immigrants Func-
tion and Taxation of Immigrants' Incomes, in VOL. II, supra note 2, at 63; Reubens, Some
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ever, is the lack of a consensus on the costs and benefits of the brain
drain. So extreme are the opinions that two polar positions can easily
be identified. At one end of the spectrum is the internationalist theory
or model of the brain drain; at the other is the nationalist theory or
model1 ° These two theories' are particularly enlightening because
they expose fundamental conflicts between the economic, cultural, and
political perspectives of the DCs and the LDCs.
The internationalist theory of the brain drain, espoused primarily
by DC economists,' 2 measures the effects of emigration in terms of the
world economy. PTKs are seen as .human capital, that is, as a factor of
production. Like any other factor of production, PTKs should be free
to seek out their highest rate of return. The internationalist model
characterizes the brain drain as the flow of human capital from the
LDCs, where its productivity is low, to the DCs, where its productivity
is high. This process increases the economic welfare of the world as a
whole" because it results in a more efficient and productive allocation
of capital. 4 Implicit in the internationalist model is the right of PTKs
to live and work in the country of their choice. 5
According to the internationalist theory, even the LDCs gain from
the brain drain. Cases are cited in which scientists and other profes-
sionals, aided by the advanced laboratories and other sophisticated
facilities of the DCs, are able to make major contributions to learning,
contributions that benefit all countries, including the LDCsj' The
Dimensions of Professional Immigration into Developed Countries from Less Developed
Countries, 196o-z973, in VoL. II, supra note 2, at 217.
io. The terms "internationalist" and "nationalist" are, of course, no more neutral in
connotation than the term "brain drain."
ii. The internationalist and nationalist theories presented in the text are composites of
the various arguments that can be identified with the respective models, and both theories
may, therefore, overstate the position of individual adherents. Furthermore, because LDCs
can be found at all stages of economic development, neither theory can describe the brain
drain of every LDC accurately or precisely. Categorical statements, whether by the inter-
nationalists or the nationalists, are likely to have only limited relevance.
x2. Professor H.G. Johnson was one of the leading exponents of the internationalist
model. His theories are fully developed in Johnson, An "Internationalist" Model, in
A^ Ams, supra note r, at 69.
13. Some internationalists recognize the social welfare effects arising from migration
but dismiss them as insignificant. E.g., id. at 75-86.
14. Adams, supra note 3, at 4.
15. Higgins, The Right in International Lau, of an Individual to Enter, Stay in and
Leave a Country, 49 INT'L AFF. 341 (1973).
x6. "[W]e can cite cases - even of Nobel prize winners - who by not going home
were enabled, with the aid of advanced laboratory equipment in a richer nation, to make
major scientific discoveries or technical advances which will ultimately benefit all nations,
their own included." Coombs, Brain Drain from Developing Countries, in INTERNATIONAL
DFvELOPmENT 61 (H. Singer, N. deKun & A. Oroobadi eds. 1966).
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greater opportunity that migration affords PTKs to exercise their
skills and talents and to realize their full potential thus accrues to
the benefit of the LDCs.Y' In addition, the internationalist school points
to the benefits that arise when PTKs return to the LDCs. Because of
the skills they develop while in the DCs, these persons are in a better
position to contribute to the advancement of their home countries18
Internationalists also emphasize that the remittances sent home by
PTKs living and working in the DCs supply the LDCs with sizable
amounts of foreign exchange. 19
The internationalist model minimizes the relationship between the
brain drain and the economic development of the LDCs. The brain
drain is viewed not as a cause of underdevelopment, but only as a
symptom or by-product of underdevelopment.20 Internationalists point
to the surplus of educated persons in many LDCs as proof of the
inability of these countries to absorb existing manpower. Indeed,
the brain drain is sometimes characterized as an asset, a so-called safety
valve,21 rather than as a liability, because it relieves the LDCs of unused
personnel and thereby reduces unemployment and social discontent.22
In fact, some LDCs are seen as deliberately training individuals for
export.23 Even in countries lacking a surplus of manpower, other
x7. The LDCs may, however, have to pay royalties or other license fees in order to have
access to processes or information generated by PTKs working in the DCs.
r8. "[S]tudy by foreigners in this country, far from increasing the 'brain drain,' prob-
ably contributes to its diminution. The overwhelming number of the people who are trained
here return home to help the development of their own countries. They thus help to
alleviate the conditions that are the fundamental reasons for emigration from their coun-
tries." Senate Brain Drain Hearings, supra note 9, at 14 (statement of Dr. Charles Frankel,
Ass't Sec'y of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs).
ig. Johnson, supra note 12, at 76 n.6. An empirical question arises as to the effect
that the proposals discussed in t" .article will have on the flow of these remittances.
2o. Myint, The Underdev/ , ed Countries: A Less Alarmist View, in ADAMS, supra
note x, at 233, 236. Proft, rs Walter Adams and Joel Dirlam unequivocally asserted:
"In all cases, the brain drain is simply the symptom of the disease rather than the disease
itself .... Adams & Dirlar, An Agenda for Action, in ADAMS, supra note 1, at 247, 261.
Some internationalists believe that the root of the brain drain is the inability of the
LDCs to create an effective demand for PTKs despite the existence of an unlimited and an
unsatisfied need for doctors, engineers, economists, and similar personnel. STUDY, supra
note 2, at 130-31. The problem then is to reduce the gap between an LDC's "need" for
PTKs and its "effective demand" for PTKs. One student of the brain drain acknowledges,
however, that to ask how the effective demand for PTKs can be increased "is to ask the
riddle of development." Baldwin, supra note 9, at 362.
21. Johnson, supra note z2, at 72-73.
22. STuDY, supra note 2, at 135-36; Silj, Should Europe Recall Its Scientists?, in
EuRoPEAN CommINrry, No. 127, Sept. 1969, at 6.
23. These countries include Barbados, the Philippines and Pakistan. The Brain Drain
of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from the Developing Countries into the United
States: Hearings Before the Research and Technical Programs Subcomm. of the House
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factors are thought to be a much greater constraint on development.
These other factors typically include shortages of capital and foreign
exchange, economic instability and inflation, a lack of natural resources,
and the absence of a political and social infrastructure that is conducive
to productivity, innovation, and efficiency.24 Finally, internationalists
argue that even if some losses might result from the brain drain, these
losses are offset by technical assistance and other forms of aid provided
by the DCs to the LDCs.
The nationalist model25 or theory of the brain drain, which reflects
the attitude of most LDCs, stands in sharp contrast to the international-
ist position. In the first place, the nationalist model rejects the uni-
versalist outlook of the internationalists. From the perspective of an
LDC, a skilled and educated person has an obligation to contribute to
his country's development. To the nationalists, the fulfillment of this
obligation is of primary importance,2 6 whether or not emigration
increases the overall welfare of the world.
The nationalist school also disputes the benefits that allegedly accrue
Comm. on Government Operations, 9oth Cong., 2d Sess. 45 (1968) (statement of Dr.
Charles Kidd, former Exee. Sec'y, Federal Council for Science and Technology, Office of
Science and Technology) [hereinafter cited as House Brain Drain Hearings]; S. NASEEM,
CASE STUDIES IN REVERSE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (BRAIN DRAIN): A SURVEY OF
PROBLEMS AND POLICIES IN PAKISTAN x6, 18, U.N. Doe. TD/B/C.6/AC.4/3 (1977)-
24. "[Development] is not likely to be promoted by concentrating attention and eco-
nomic policy on the accumulation of [human] capital on the assumption that all else will
follow." Johnson, supra note 12, at 86.
25. See, e.g., Patinkin, A "Nationalist" Model, in ADAMS, supra note i, at 92.
26.
Some of our citizens will have large amounts of money spent on their education,
while others have none. Those who receive the privilege therefore have a duty to
repay the sacrifices which others have made. They are like the man who has been
given all the food available in a starving village in order that he may have strength
to bring supplies back from a distant place. If he takes this food and does not bring
help to his brothers, he is a traitor. Similarly, if any of the young men and women
who are given education by the people of this Republic adopt attitudes of superiority,
or fail to use their knowledge to help the development of this country, then they are
betraying our Union.
President Nyerere of Tanzania, quoted and reprinted in Harbison, Problems of Developing
Higher Education in the Newly Developing Countries, TASK FORCE ON INTERNATIONAL
EDUCATION, supra note 2, at 465, 471-72. Former Israeli Premier Levi Eshkol labeled
emigrating scientists and engineers "gypsies," and a former Israeli Minister of Education
called them "traitors." Adams, supra note 3, at 2. These views are shared by officials in
the United Kingdom, some of whose physicians have emigrated to the United States.
One of Britain's former Ministers of Health, Sir Kenneth Robinson, declared that he was
not prepared to "invest thousands of pounds sterling in a medical student only to increase
the membership of the American Medical Association." Quoted in H. MAGoLES & L.
BLOcK, FOREIGN MEDICAL GRADUATES IN Tim UNIrrD STATES at vii-viii (1969). Recent
changes in United States immigration law may reduce the number of foreign physicians
entering the United States. See note 48 infra.
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to the LDCs from the brain drain 7 The LDCs argue that much of
the work done by PTKs in the DCs is irrelevant to the needs of the
LDCs s Although a PTK might be more productive in a DC, his
efforts are likely to be oriented toward DC problems rather than LDC
problems.29 Indeed, many PTKs never return home simply because
no need exists for the skills that they have acquired in the DC."° For
example, DC-trained physicians may develop specialties in dermatology,
allergies, and coronary disease but may know nothing about malaria,
malnutrition, leprosy, or other diseases whose treatment may be of
27.
In fact, one can go right down the line and take up nearly all of the arguments of
those who consider that the brain drain generates several externalities for the native
LDCs of emigration and argue that they are largely the products of arm-chair theoriz-
ing or the results of experience with intra-DC brain drain (e.g., from Canada to
U.S.A.) where many of the important countervailing arguments are not terribly
pertinent.
Bhagwati, The Brain Drain Tax Proposal and the Issues, in VoL. I, supra note 2, at 3,
26-27.
28. In some cases, the LDCs may themselves encourage research and technology that
is inconsistent with their needs. Professor Nader points to Pakistan, which allocated so
times more money for nuclear research than it allocated for research on either the
production of jute or the development of fishing resources, even though both of the
latter activities generated over $3oo million in foreign exchange. Nader, Technical
Experts in Developing Countries, in SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN DEVELOPINO COUNTRIES
450 (C. Nader & A. Zahlan eds. 1969).
29. An exception might be those PTKs who work for international agencies on behalf
of their own governments. Professor Bhagwati, however, claims that "it is well known
that many of these jobs are essentially 'prizes' awarded to civil servants who thereby get
highly-paid jaunts abroad ...." Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 23 n.43.
3o. According to one estimate, over 9o% of all Asian students in the United States
never return home. Adams, supra note 3, at r. More than 70% of all immigrant profes-
sionals from Taiwan, Korea, India, and Iran are nonreturning students. Fortney, Immi-
grant Professionals, 6 INT'L MIGRATION Rav. 50, 57 (972). The failure of these PTKs
to return home is, presumably, not due solely to the nature of the skills they have acquired
in the DCs. The longer a student remains abroad, the less likely he is to return home,
regardless of the nature of his skills. According to Rev. W. Gibbons of Fordham Univer-
sity, foreign students who remain in the United States at least one year after completing
their studies are inclined to stay permanently. House Brain Drain Hearings, supra note
23, at 4. Marriage to a DC resident also lowers the likelihood that a PTK will return
home. For a study of the correlation between marriage to North Americans and the brain
drain to North America, see Wilson & Gaston, New Light on the Brain Drain, NEw
SCIENrr 236 (1969).
Some LDCs offer various incentives to induce PTKs to return home. These incentives
are sometimes resented by those professionals who did not emigrate. For the incentives
offered by the Philippines to returning scientists, see F. SicAT, supra note 3, at 13-14; for
the incentives offered by India, see COUNCIL OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL RESEAXcH o
INDIA, supra note 3, at 21-23.
PTKs who choose not to return home on a permanent basis may, nevertheless, work
temporarily in the LDCs under foundation grants, exchange programs, and the like. Pro-
fessor Bhagwati argues that these short visits will often be resented by those professionals
who remained in the LDCs and thus lead to a decrease in their productivity. Bhagwati,
supra note 27, at 26.
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overwhelming importance in the LDCP3 The nationalists ask how
the welfare of the world will be increased if a doctor emigrates from
an LDC suffering from an acute shortage of physicians and becomes a
dermatologist in a DCY2
The LDCs accuse the internationalists of misunderstanding the
nature and the extent of the harm to the LDCs caused by the brain
drain. The loss of the specialized disciplines and skills of such PTKs
as doctors, scientists, engineers, professionals, and scholars, especially
by LDCs in which these personnel are already in short supply, is felt
to be a tremendous hindrance to development efforts. The nationalists
argue that, for these countries, the brain drain clearly constitutes a
catastrophe and an irreplaceable loss of resources. The nationalist
school contends, further, that the brain drain is injurious in a less
obvious way, one that is admittedly difficult to measure. Educated
persons play a crucial role in terms of their contribution to an LDC's
political, social, and cultural milieu,3 3 and the brain drain therefore
deprives an LDC of just those persons who are the most likely to "set
the tone of society, establish national values and goals," 34 and bring
about the "structural and institutional changes necessary if a nation is
to become a modern state."" The brain drain prevents the creation
and dissemination of a spirit of intellectualism and scientism, a spirit
that is vital to economic growth.3 6 In LDCs having a surplus of skilled
3X. "The most difficult problem relating to the training of foreign physicians from
developing countries is the frequency with which the U.S. training programs lack rele-
vance to the trainee's future responsibilities in his own country." West, Foreign Interns
and Residents in the United States, 40 J. MEn. EDuc. 1I1O, 1128 (1965).
32. Stated more technically, the argument is that the marginal social product of a PTK
in an LDC far exceeds whatever increase in the economic welfare of the world might
arise from his emigration to a DC. For a more complete discussion, see Bhagwati &
Rodriguez, Welfare - Theoretical Analyses of the Brain Drain, in VOL. If, supra note 2,
at 85; Bhagwati & Delalfar, supra note 9, at 33-34.
33. "In a profound sense, medical and other scientifically trained persons occupy
pivotal positions in that they help change values, a necessary condition for changing
institutions." Nader, supra note 28, at 457.
34. STUDY, supra note 2, at 138.
35. COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION OF TALENT, THE INTERNATIONAL
MIGRATION Op HIGH-LsvErL MANPOWER: ITS IMPACT ON THE DEvELoPMENT PROCESS 689
(1970). A number of scholars from both the DCs and the LDCs argue, however, that the
brain drain can awaken a country to the need for self-examination and thus stimulate
social change. House Brain Drain Hearings, supra note 23, at 54 (statement of Professor
W. Adams); A. SAID, BaAIN DRAIN: Tin DEvELOPING CONTRIS - CAusES, RA IFICA-
TIONS AND PROSPECTS 26 (1970); Patinkin, supra note 25, at 98-99.
36.
Developing countries need not only specific skills but also leadership and organiz-
ing ability. A continuing drain of highly trained people can over the long run add
to a sense of national frustration, . . . lower the sense of worth of those who
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manpower, the loss of an educated person's political, social, and cul-
tural contributions may outweigh the loss of his specific skills. Charac-
terizing the brain drain as an asset because it relieves the LDC of
surplus manpower thus ignores the impact of this other loss.
7
The LDCs have other grounds for challenging the internationalists'
characterization of the brain drain as an asset. The LDCs argue that
the opportunity to immigrate encourages individuals to obtain skills
and pursue disciplines that increase their attractiveness as potential
DC immigrants, regardless of whether such skills are needed in the
LDCs. If the opportunity to immigrate did not exist, individuals would
pursue careers that provided them with skills marketable in their home
countries, skills that satisfy LDC needs rather than DC needs88
Further, the nationalist model regards a pool of professionals, even
if underemployed temporarily, as a reserve that can be tapped as the
need arises in the future.39
The nationalist model stresses the benefits accruing to the DCs from
immigration: the contributions made by foreign scientists, doctors,
engineers, and professionals to DC technology and learning; the
savings arising from the DCs' not being fully responsible for training
and educating these individuals; 40 and the availability of these individ-
remain, reduce further the small group of potential political and administrative lead-
ers, and reduce the cadre of technically trained people who must be at hand when
the process of development gathers momentum.
House Brain Drain Hearings, supra note 23, at 48 (statement of Dr. Charles Kidd).
37. Some observers suggest that an LDC whose PTKs emigrate suffcrs another loss, a
loss of national prestige. STUDY, supra note 2, at 150. This loss is said to affect an LDC's
standing in the international community. Others maintain, however, that a PTK who
works abroad enhances the prestige and reputation of his country. Id. at 150-51. Professor
Bhagwati argues that PTKs abroad can create the feeling among those who remain in the
LDCs that serious work and recognition are feasible only in the Des. Bhagwati, supra
note 27, at 26.
38. According to Professor Bhagwati, if PTK physicians did not have the opportunity
to immigrate, many who have congregated in the urban areas in anticipation of emigrating
might leave the urban areas and practice medicine in the rural areas, where a critical need
for their services exists. The possibility of emigration may thus prevent this highly desir-
able internal redistribution of medical services from occurring. Bhagwati, supra note 27,
at io. See generally Hamada & Bhagwati, Domestic Distortions, Imperfect In/ormnation
and the Brain Drain, in VOL. I, supra note 2, at 139.
39- STUDY, supra note 2, at 131.
40. Professor Kelly M. West of the University of Oklahoma Medical School estimates
that the United States would have to build and operate 12 new medical schools to produce
the same manpower that is being derived through immigration. According to Professor
West, this "foreign aid" that the United States receives through immigration is equal to
the total cost of United States medical aid to foreign nations. Adams, supra note 3, at a.
The situation is similar in other DCs. Togo has sent more physicians and professors to
France than France has sent to Togo; the number of medical specialists from the Com-
monwealth countries working in Britain is greater than the number of British specialists
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uals to reduce DC shortages in certain key areas, such as medicine.4 '
The LDCs see themselves as making a gift to the DCs of their
educated elite -persons who were trained at considerable expense as a
public investment.42 They resent that their resources are being used to
enrich the already rich DCs.
Finally, the LDCs view foreign aid, including technical assistance
provided by the DCs, as an unsuccessful attempt to offset the harm
caused by the brain drain. They maintain not only that a substantial
portion of foreign aid is simply disguised military assistance, but also
that the countries receiving economic development assistance are not
the ones that suffer from the brain drain. The LDCs also fear that the
DCs are retrenching on their commitments to foreign aid. Most im-
portant, however, they question whether the developmental programs
instituted by the DCs can ever result in sustained economic growth as
long as the brain drain reduces the pool of indigenous talent available
to carry them out.
The extremes from which the nationalists and internationalists view
the costs and benefits of the brain drain are also reflected in their
opinions on the causes of migration 3 The internationalists emphasize
what could be called "push" factors, that is, forces originating within
the LDCs which induce emigration. Among the typical push factors
are the following: 44 (i) an educational system that fails to train stu-
dents in disciplines relevant to the needs of the LDC and therefore
produces a surplus of educated persons who are underemployed, frus-
trated, and discontented; 45 (2) an inadequate scientific and technological
infrastructure; (3) educational institutions that are rigid and tradition-
oriented and that lack qualified teachers and graduate research
working in the Commonwealth. Id. See also CoNG. REc. SII,253 (daily ed. July x, 1976)
(remarks of Sen. Beall) (D-Md.)).
41. The entire graduating class of a new medical school in Thailand was reported to
have chartered an airplane to fly to the United States. Dublin, The Migration of Physi-
cians to the United States, 1972 NEw ENO. J. MaD. 875.
42. Adams, supra note 3, at 5.
43. For studies concerning the factors that motivate emigration, see Krugman &
Bhagwati, The Decision to Migrate, in VoL. II, supra note 2, at 31; Levy & Wadycki,
Education and the Decision to Migrate: An Econometric Analysis of Migration in Ven-
ezuela, 42 EcONOmETRICA 377 (1974); Psacharopoulos, Estimating Some Key Parameters
in the Brain Drain Taxation Model, in VOL. II, supra note 2, at 53; Vanderkamp, Migra-
tion Flows, Their Determinants and the Effects of Return Migration, 79 J. PoLrrIcA
EcoN. or2 (1971).
44. For a general discussion of the push factors, see STUDY, supra note 2, at 195-2io.
45. For a discussion of the political and the economic forces that may distort educa-
tional policies in an LDC, see Myint, supra note 2o, at 239-40.
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facilities; 6 (4) the absence of a cultural and intellectual community;
(5) a rigid social structure that perpetuates class barriers; (6) racial,
tribal, religious, and economic discrimination; 47 (7) the lack of a
meritocracy; (8) resistance to innovation; (9) a lack of upward
mobility; (io) political oppression and instability; (in) a low standard
of living and unpleasant working conditions; and (12) the absence of
career opportunities and advancement.
The nationalists, by comparison, focus on "pull" factors, that is,
forces originating in the DCs which encourage immigration. Many
of the pull factors are simply the converse of certain push factors, such
as higher salaries, better research facilities, and greater opportunities
for advancement in the DCs. Other pull factors, however, are thought
to be the result of conscious policy decisions that are detrimental to
the LDCs. For example, the LDCs view the shortage of doctors in the
United States, a pull factor, as the result of the policy of the American
Medical Association (AMA). According to this view, the AMA pur-
posely restricts the supply of United States-trained doctors, thereby
artificially creating a shortage that is partially filled by persons from
the LDCs.48  '
Perhaps what disturbs the LDCs the most is the active competition
among the DCs for skilled immigrants. As evidence of this competition,
the LDCs cite statements by DC officials, such as former Secretary of
State Dean Rusk: "We are in the international market of brains." 
40
46. STUDY, supra note 2, at 93.
47. Some of these push factors may also exist in the DCs and may therefore offset the
LDC push factors. One scholar has cynically observed that "in all probability one of the
major contributions of the developed countries (read primarily, the U.S.A.) in diminishing
the 'brain drain' from Asia-African countries has been made by the racial tension and
discrimination within their borders." Patinkin, supra note 25, at 95.
48. A somewhat similar situation is said to exist in the United Kingdom where the
British government has been accused of purposely limiting the salaries of its National
Health Service doctors in order to curtail costs. The low salaries provide British doctors
with an incentive to emigrate, and their positions are usually filled by doctors from the
LDCs. Johnson, An "Internationalist" Model, in ADAMS, supra note 1, at 73.
In 1976, the United States enacted the Health Professions Educational Assistance Act
of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, 90 Stat. 2243 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.),
which restricts the immigration of alien physicians. This legislation was motivated both
by a belief that alien physicians are generally inferior to United States-trained physicians
and by a concern for restricting the emigration of doctors from nations in which they
are needed. Because of protests from many metropolitan hospitals that rely heavily on
alien physicians, the effective date of key provisions of this legislation was postponed
until January, 1978, and, thus, it is too early to evaluate the effects of this law. See Kaye,
Danilov & McDonald, Alien Physicians and Their Admission into the United States,
16 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 6z, 63-64 (1978).
49. REPORT os THE U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 7, at so n.8. United States
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The views of Canadian officials are similar: "The high cost of training
professional and skilled people - engineers, doctors, skilled technicians,
etc.- is a measure of the benefit derived upon [their] arrival in
Canada .... Other countries are in competition with us for immi-
grants." 0 The reformulation of immigration policies by some DCs,
though not undertaken for the purpose of attracting PTKs, has none-
theless had that effect." Dr. Charles Frankel, former Assistant Secre-
tary of State, admits that "there is ... a prima facie case for the
proposition that our new immigration policies may aggravate the prob-
lems of many countries that are seeking to progress, and that need
leaders and trained people to show the way."52 Some LDCs find it
hypocritical that the DCs offer them technical assistance with one
hand and lure away their PTKs with the other.
3
The disparate perspectives of the LDCs and the DCs lead not only
multinational corporations, universities, and hospitals all recruit abroad. House Brain
Drain Hearings, supra note 23, at 6-7; Senate Brain Drain Hearings, supra note 9, at 103.
50. REPORT OF Trl SECRETARY GENERAL, supra note 2, at so n.8 (quoting J. MARCHAND,
VmTE PAPER ON IMMIGRATION (x966)).
51. In 1967, Canada adopted a new set of immigration regulations to eliminate the
racial discrimination in its prior law. The new regulations favor professional and skilled
workers and have the effect of encouraging PTK immigration. DeVorets & Maki, supra
note 9, at 54-55. For a discussion of the Canadian immigration law, see Black, Novel
Features of the Immigration Act, 1976, 41 CAN. BAt REv. 561 (1978).
52. Senate Brain Drain Hearings, supra note 9, at 17. The new policies referred to by
Dr. Frankel involved a shift by the United States from a national origins quota system to
a system based on occupational qualifications; the intention was to remove the racial
restrictions inherent in the old system. Like Canada's new regulations, see note 51 supra,
the new United States system makes it easier for LDC PTKs to enter the country.
The competition among the DCs may not necessarily increase the overall number of
PTKs emigrating from the LDCs; instead, it may only divert immigration from one DC
to another. The very limited evidence that exists suggests otherwise, however. Balacs &
Gordon, supra note 9, at 81.
53. "With one hand the United States is giving these countries millions to develop
themselves. And with the other it is casually taking away the seed corn of future leaders
in natural science, health, and technical knowledge. These are even more precious to the
country than food or machinery." Adams, supra note 3, at 3. Former Senator Mondale
(D Minn.), a champion of the LDC's position on the brain drain, expressed similar views:
[The brain drain] compromises our commitment to development assistance, by
depriving new nations of high-level manpower indispensable to their progress. It
runs counter to the education and training programs which are so vital in our foreign
aid ... the brain drain among students more than cancels out one important phase
of our foreign assistance programs.
I1= CoNO. REc. 2X,477 (1966). For similar conclusions, see House Brain Drain Hearings,
supra note 23, at 22; Letter of William C. Gibbons, Agency for International Develop-
ment, to Senator Mondale (Sept. 23, x966), reprinted in 112 CONG. REc. 26,503 (1966);
Coombs, supra note x6, at 62; Henderson, Students: Exchange or Immigration, in TAsK
FoRcE ON INTERNATIONAL EnUCATIoN, supra note 2, at 348, 349, reprinted from Nafsa
News Letter (Nov. 15, 1964); Seltzer, Brain Drain: What Should and Can Be Done?, in
INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMrNT 56 (H. Singer, N. de Kun & A. Oroobadi eds. 1966).
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to disagreement about the causes of the brain drain, but also to dis-
agreement about remedies. In many LDCs, the individual is often
viewed as existing for the good of the state and as having an obligation
to contribute to the overall welfare of the country.Y4 If this attitude
prevails, emigration is likely to be regarded as a privilege, rather than
as a right. Under these circumstances, restricting emigration appears
to be a natural solution to the brain drain. The restrictions can take
many forms,5 the most extreme being an outright ban on the emigra-
tion of professionals.5 6 Less severe would be a requirement that newly
graduated professionals work for the government for a certain period
of time or a requirement that emigrants repay the costs of any pub-
licly provided education before leaving. Still another approach is
illustrated by India's ban on the holding of the AMA's Educational
Council for Foreign Medical Graduates (ECFMG) examination, which
is a prerequisite for immigration to the United States as a physician.
57
Restrictions on emigration are rarely implemented satisfactorily. "
Quite often, they are vehemently opposed by individuals within the
LDCs. In more than one case, domestic protests have been successful
in forcing a rescission of the restrictions."9 Moreover, emigration con-
trols are denounced by most DCs because they are committed to the
principle of the free movement of all individuals. Unlike the LDCs,
the DCs view emigration as a right, not as a privilege. The right of an
individual to self-realization and fulfillment has priority over any
obligation that he might have as a member of a state. Most DCs are
therefore opposed to LDC restrictions on emigration. Similarly, they
54. See, e.g., Ceylon Daily News, May 27, 1974, at 4.
55. For examples, see CouNciL. OF SCIENTIFIC AND INDUSTRIAL REsEARcH OF INDIA,
supra note 3, at 24; MARGA INSTITUTE, supra note 7, at 11-13; S. NASEui%5, stspra note
23, at 28-29.
56. An outright ban on emigration might not achieve the desircd effects if, out of
bitterness and frustration, a PTK refused to devote himself fully to his country's dcvclop-
ment.
57. Apparently, many Indian doctors circumvented the law by taking the examination
abroad. Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 8. The prohibition proved to be unsuccessful and
was soon dropped. R. STEVENS & J. VERMEULEN, FOREIGN TRAINED PHYSICIANS AND
AmERICAN MEDICINE 7 (1972). The Philippines also considered banning the ECFMG
examination, but this proposal was never adopted. F. SICAT, supra note 3, at 9. When
Sri Lanka (then Ceylon) was threatened with a polio epidemic in 1971, it did succeed in
prohibiting the emigration of physicians. Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 8.
58. The Berlin Wall is one of the more blatant and visible attempts to constrain a
brain drain by physical means. Data on East European salary differentials imply that the
Berlin Wall has been relatively ineffective in preventing PTKs from emigrating. Blagwati,
supra note 27, at 27.
59. Id. at 9.
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are unsympathetic to LDC pleas that they change their immigration
laws ° or adopt policies designed to discourage the brain drain.
DC remedies focus on reducing the push factors that encourage the
brain drain. This approach is obviously more palatable than the im-
position, by either the LDCs or the DCs, of restrictions on emigration.
Naturally, few LDCs would deny that improved living conditions,
higher salaries, 0' better research facilities, and greater career oppor-
tunities would encourage more PTKs to remain at home. Indeed,
whether the brain drain is viewed as a symptom of underdevelopment
or as its cause, economic growth will moderate the push factors and
therefore attenuate the urge to emigrate. Undoubtedly, the DCs can
help the LDCs reduce the push factors through international develop-
ment efforts, but the effect of these efforts will obviously not be felt for
some time. The LDCs fear that they are caught in a vicious circle:
unless the brain drain can be reduced, development will not occur; yet
without development, the brain drain will not subside.
The DCs' lack of a specific and immediate plan of attack has rein-
forced LDC suspicions that the DCs are indifferent to their plight."
The LDCs point out that current interest in PTK emigration centered
initially on emigration from Britain to the United States and not on
emigration from the LDCs.13 In addition, many LDCs are concerned
6o. In testifying before the Senate Judiciary Committee, former Assistant Secretary of
State Charles Frankel refused to endorse a number of proposed alterations in United
States immigration laws which would have eased the brain drain. Baldwin, Brain Drain
or Overflow?, 48 FoREioN AFF. 358, 369 (970).
The Health Professions Educational Assistance Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-484, 90
Stat. 2243 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), however, which restricts the
emigration of physicians to the United States, see note 48 supra, was partially motivated
out of concern for the losses suffered by countries experiencing an emigration of physicians
to the United States. "There is a moral implication associated with importing inexpensive
manpower from developing countries which have serious care problems and manpower
shortages." X22 CoNG. REc. SIs,258 (daily ed. July I, 1976) (remarks of Sen. Kennedy
(D-Mass.)).
61. Increasing the salaries of PTKs would, however, have undesirable inegalitarian
consequences. Bhagwati & Hamada, supra note 38, at 113.
62. The dates of many of the materials cited in this article indicate that a flurry of
concern over the brain drain occurred in the United States from the mid-ig6o's to the
mid-197o's. Despite numerous studies and hearings, the only congressional attempt to
intervene in the brain drain was that of former Senator Mondale (D-Minn.). In 1966, he
introduced S. 3905, the International Brain Drain Act, which was designed to assist the
LDCs. S. 3905, 89 th Cong., 2d Sess., 112 CoNG. REc. 26,495 (1966). This bill was never
reported out of committee. With the exception of the Health Professions Educational
Assistance Act of 1976, which was enacted partially in response to the brain drain of
physicians, see notes 48 & 6o supra, recent United States interest in the brain drain has
subsided sharply. One possible interpretation, though obviously disputed by the LDCs, is
that this decline in interest simply reflects a lessening of the underlying problems.
63. Although Athenaeus had written of "the drain of Greek brains to Alexandria," see
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about the vitality and extent of DC commitments to international
development assistance. An even more cynical view is that the DCs
have an interest in the continuance of the brain drain because of the
benefits accruing to them as the countries of immigration. 4 Some
LDCs accuse the DCs of hypocritically arguing for unrestricted emi-
gration while simultaneously shaping their own immigration policies
to admit skilled rather than unskilled persons."' The DC call is no
longer give me "your tired, your poor, your huddled masses," but, rather,
give me "your alert, your privileged, your brainy, your talented." 00
The inability of the DCs and the LDCs to agree on the causes and
consequences of the brain drain has frustrated attempts at international
cooperation. The DCs and the LDCs appear on a collision course. The
LDCs are increasingly articulate in their unwillingness to tolerate condi-
tions that they consider adverse to their interests, and they are no longer
content to implement measures unilaterally. The DCs may not be sym-
pathetic to LDC pleas for intervention, but the realities of international
politics dictate that some satisfactory DC response be forthcoming.
A recent contribution to the brain drain literature by Professor
Jagdish Bhagwati of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology has
provided the DCs and the LDCs with a center of focus. Professor
Bhagwati formulates the moral principle that, in a world of imperfect
mobility of labor, individuals who are able to migrate from the LDCs
to the DCs ought to contribute to improving the welfare of those left
behind by sharing their increased income and other benefits. 7 His
argument, more fully developed elsewhere,' is the strongest when
university education in an LDC, which is usually required for DC
immigration, is accessible only to the children of the political and
note i supra, the term "brain drain" apparently made its contemporary appearance in a
x962 report by the British Royal Society, concerning the emigration of physicians and
engineers from the United Kingdom to the United States. STUDY, tpra note 2, at is.
64. "Brain drain had never been a great national issue - not even a national issue -
perhaps because the United States gained and other countries suffered the losses." STUDY,
supra note 2, at 235-36.
65. A report by the United Nations Secretary-General described the DCs as exhibiting
a universal preference for the highly trained, the elite immigrant." Rxsosr op rta
SacRETAstY-GEwEA, supra note 2, at 7. The United States, the United Kingdom, Canada,
and Australia all have immigration laws that favor PTKs.
66. Perkins, Foreign Aid and the Brain Drain, 44 FostroN Ass. 6o8, 617 (1966).
67. Professor Bhagwati's proposal was first sketched in Bhagwati, The United States
in the Nixon Era: The End of Innocence, ios DAEDALUS 25 (1972), and later refined in
Bhagwati & Dellalfar, supra note 9.
68. Bhagwati, International Migration of the Highly Skilled: Economics, Ethics and
Tax Arrangements (publication forthcoming in i Tma WoLn Q., No. 2 (June 1979));
Bhagwati, supra note 9, at 9-12; Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 52, 14, 22.
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economic elite.6 9 Indeed, in some LDCs, higher education may serve to
perpetuate an inegalitarian social and economic order. If the universi-
ties in an LDC purposely conduct classes in a language not spoken
by all social classes, language becomes a tool of economic and cultural
oppression in that it denies certain groups access to higher education.
Whatever its causes, however, the lack of equal educational oppor-
tunity is widespread in the underdeveloped world. According to
Professor Bhagwati, those individuals who enjoy the privilege or
advantage of higher education and are therefore able to emigrate
should share their increased benefits with those lacking the same
opportunities for educational and economic advancement." ° Professor
Bhagwati's principle is thus independent of whether losses are incurred
by the LDC because of the brain drain. To the extent that such losses
occur, Professor Bhagwati's position is reinforced.71
To implement his proposition, Professor Bhagwati recommends that
a tax be levied on the income earned by PTKs within the DCs7' and
that the revenue be channeled back to the LDCs.Y3 By lowering the
salaries received by PTKs in the DCs, the tax would make the wages
paid to PTKs resident in the LDCs more competitive and would there-
fore reduce one of the push factors. In addition, the revenue from the
tax would to some extent compensate the LDC for any losses suffered
through emigration. Professor Bhagwati also formulates the moral
principle that the DCs of immigration should share their benefits with
the LDCs of emigration. 74 This principle could be implemented through
69. Bhagwati, Education, Clas-s Structure and Income Equality, I WORLD Dav. 95
(1973).
70. Professor Bhagwati also defends his proposal on the grounds that DC immigration
restrictions, in combination with the large salary differentials that exist between the
DCs and the LDCs, imply that PTKs enjoy windfall gains in the nature of economic
rent. These rents, according to Bhagwati, "can be taxed to social advantage without en-
tailing any harmful effects through distortion of resource-allocational incentives." J. BHAo-
wAYr, supra note 68.
71. For an attempt to identify the nature and composition of these losses, see J. BHAG-
wArs, TsE R avsE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY (BRAI DRAIN): ACCOUNTING, COMPENSA-
TiON, TAXATiON AND RELATED POLICY PROPOS.LS, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC. 4/2 (1977);
VOL. II, supra note 2.
72. See note 124 infra.
73. Professor Bhagwati argues that it is "somewhat self-serving and hypocritical for
us to ask the rich countries to levy taxes on their own citizens to finance foreign aid to
our countries, while not undertaking any direct tax burden ourselves." J. BHAGWATI, supra
note 68. Professor Jan Tinbergen endorsed Professor Bhagwati's proposal, observing "it
is my hope that this tax might also help to convince public opinion in the rich countries
that more has to be done in the field of development co-operation." Quoted in J. BHAG-
WATr, supra note 71, at 32 n.45.
74. Professor Bhagwati defends this approach on the grounds that if the rich (the DCs)
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a tax or special assessment on host DCs.7" At a minimum, however,
the gains accruing to the DCs impose an obligation on them to co-
operate with the LDCs in taxing the income earned by PTKs.
Professor Bhagwad's proposal to tax emigrant PTKs was discussed
and analyzed at a conference held in Bellagio, Italy, in 1975."' The
conference was an interdisciplinary venture, bringing together both
lawyers and economists from various countries. The authors prepared a
discussion draft for use at the conference which explored not only
Professor Bhagwati's proposal, but also various other tax measures for
intervening in the brain drain. An expanded version of that discussion
draft was subsequently published.77 The United Nations Conference
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which has been studying
the brain drain for a number of years, responded by requesting a
further inquiry,7 and, in February, 1978, the authors' findings were
debated in Geneva at an UNCTAD conference.19 Although no
benefit because of the poor (the LDCs), they should transfer part of their gains to the
poor. Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 12, 17. He contrasts this principle with the traditional
justification for foreign aid - the principle of redistribution per se. Id. at 14 n.27.
75. See section I(E) infra.
76. The conference was held at the Villa Serbelloni, February 15-19, 1975, and was
supported by a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, which was administered by the
Institute for World Order. Some of the papers presented at this conference were published
in 3 WoR.n Dzv. (1975); 2. J. Dav. Eco. (r975); VOL. 1, supra note 2; VoL. I, supra
note 2.
77. Oldman & Pomp, The Brain Drain: A Tax Analysis of the Bhagwati Proposal,
3 WoRLD DaI. 751 (1975), reprinted in VOL. I, supra note x, at 167.
78. The brain drain has been under study by UNCTAD's Committee on Transfer of
Technology. At its first session in 1975, this committee adopted resolution 2 (I), para-
graph 9 of which reads:
Requests the Secretary-General of UNCTAD:
(a) In pursuance of Conference resolution 39 (III) and Economic and Social
Council resolution 1904 (LVII) of a August 1974, and in full co-operation
with the Under Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, to carry out
studies assessing the magnitude, composition, causes and effects of the outflow
of trained personnel from the developing countries;
(b) To convene a group of governmental experts to examine the studies, and to
submit, if possible, recommendations to the Committee on Transfer of Tech-
nology at its second session.
UNCTAD, Report of the Group of Governmental Experts on Reverse Transfer of Tech-
nology, U.N. Doe. TD/B/C.6/28 (1978), at 2. At its fourth session, in 1976, UNC'TAD
adopted resolution 87 (IV) in which it recommended "that all countries, particularly those
benefiting from the brain drain, should, in the light of the studies assessing the magni-
tude, composition, causes and effects of the outflow of trained personnel from developing
countries ... consider what measures may be necessary to deal with the problems posed
by such outflow .... " The authors' report, R. Pomp & 0. Oldman, Consideration of
Policy Issues at the International Level, Legal and Administrative Aspects of Compensa-
tion, Taxation and Related Policy Measures: Suggestions for an Optimal Policy Mix, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/Q6/AC.4 /7 (1977), was commissioned in accordance with these resolutions.
79. Participants at the conference included representatives from Algeria, Argentina,
Australia, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, Finland, France,
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specific action was taken at that meeting, UNCTAD is continuing its
study of this report, a revised version of which is presented in this article.
II. THE PROPOSALS
Each of the proposals discussed below for intervening in the brain drain
would provide revenue for use in the LDCs. The manner in which
this revenue would be controlled and distributed has never been fully
dealt with, either at the Bellagio conference or at the UNCTAD
conference. One approach, envisioned by the authors, is the creation of
a set of organizations, called brain drain funds, which are discussed in
section A.
The proposals set forth are of three types. The first, which is dis-
cussed in section B, is that tax incentives be offered to encourage PTKs,
their employers, and other concerned persons and organizations to
make voluntary contributions for use in the LDCs. This proposal is
attractive because of the ease with which it can be implemented and
because participation is entirely voluntary. The second proposal is that
a special tax be levied on emigrant PTKs, and two variations are
presented in sections C and D: a tax levied by the LDC and a tax
levied by the United Nations. The analysis in section C of an LDC
tax on emigrant PTKs suggests that its enforcement may not be prac-
ticable for many countries because of administrative obstacles and that
such a tax could be formulated and implemented more successfully by
an international organization. This variation-an international brain
drain tax levied by the United Nations-is explored in section D.
The final proposal, a United Nations assessment on the DCs of immi-
gration, is outlined in section E.
Gabon, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait,
Lebanon, Madagascar, Malaysia, Malta, Mexico, The Netherlands, Nigeria, Norway, Pak-
istan, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad
and Tobago, Turkey, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the United States, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia,
Zaire, the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat,
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization, the United Nations Environ-
ment Programme, the International Labour Organization, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Council of Arab Economic Unity, the Inter-
governmental Committee for European Migration, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, the Organization of American States, the Commission of
the Churches of International Affairs, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the
World Federation of Free Trade Unions.
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A. Brain Drain Funds
The attractiveness of the tax proposals is dependent on the articulation
of acceptable goals for the-use of the revenue raised and on the manner
in which the goals would be implemented. The spending goals must
be related to the principal motivation behind the tax proposals-
concern over the brain drain. The Bellagio conference made it apparent
that little support could be expected if the proposals were viewed as
merely augmenting the coffers of the LDCs. Many participants were
skeptical about leaving the formulation and implementation of spend-
ing objectives to the discretion of the LDCs. Once revenue is trans-
ferred to an LDC, the enforcement of restrictions on its use might
become difficult. Moreover, the DCs are likely to be unreceptive to the
direct transfer of funds to unpopular or oppressive LDC regimes.
Instead of funds being transferred directly to the LDCs, a set of
organizations, called brain drain funds (BDFs), interposed between
the DCs and the LDCs, might be created. The BDFs would receive,
control, and disburse on approved LDC-oriented projects the revenue
raised by voluntary contributions, 0 by a United Nations tax on emi-
grant PTKs,8' and by a United Nations assessment on host DCs.s2
No attempt is made to provide a blueprint for BDFs, because they
could obviously be structured and operated in numerous ways. They
could, for example, be created by the United Nations, or by a regional
organization, such as the European Economic Community or the
Organization of American States, or by individual countries. Although
the legal characteristics of the BDFs might vary, they would all be
nonprofit in the sense that the funds received would be used only for
certain purposes and not for private gain. Their governing structures
would be specified in their charters, and their powers to receive and
disburse funds would be clearly defined. The organization of the BDFs
would be tailored to promote efficient decision making and to expedite
the distribution of funds in accordance with stated objectives.
The BDFs could have, as one of their objectives, the identification
and reduction of the push factors that encourage the brain drain.
Consistent with this objective would be the use of their revenues for
8o. See section II(B) infra.
8i. See section II(D) infra.
82. See section I1(E) infra. Obviously, the revenue from an LDC tax on emigrant
PTKs, see section H(C) infra, would flow to the LDC directly, rather than indirectly,
through BDFs.
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general developmental purposes or for the support of university re-
search facilities within the LDCs. Special programs could also be
designed. One possibility would be a study directed at countering the
brain drain itself. Another program might focus on training individuals
to carry out that special study. The authors' preferences are for research
and training that would lead to the development of new technologies
by the LDCs. Often, the transfer of existing technology from the DCs
is not a satisfactory solution to the problems facing the LDCs; building
the capacity of an LDC to develop its own technology is of far more
value in the long run."'
The BDFs might be specialized by country, by type of project, or by
some combination of the two. In addition, revenues flowing into them
could be earmarked for specific uses and specific countries. Precedent
for the earmarking of voluntary contributions, one of the proposed
sources of BDF revenue, already exists in the operation of the United
Nations Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF): donors may stip-
ulate that their contributions be used for particular objectives, projects,
and countries on the UNICEF agenda.84 The idea of granting persons
control over the use of their funds offers new opportunities for experi-
mentation in dealing with the entire complex of brain drain problems.
An additional advantage of earmarking is that the funds are not likely
to flow to LDCs having reprehensible domestic policies85 For this
83. See E. SCHUMACHER, SMALL is BEauAIFtiI. 171-90 (1975); Kuznets, Modern Eco-
nomic Growth: Findings and Reflections, 63 Am. ECON. REv. 247 (1973).
The United Nations World Plan of Action for the Second Development Decade contains
a list of specific research problems of special relevance to the LDCs, for example, the
development of new sources of edible protein; the development of pest controls suitable
for small farmers; the use of tropical hardwoods and fibers for pulp and paper production;
and the control of bilharzia. H. SINGER & J. ANSARI, RICH AND POOR CoUNRIEs 220 (1977).
In general, BDFs could promote research on the food, health, population, energy, environ-
mental and natural resource problems of the LDCs.
84. See UNITED NATIONS CsIULnREN'S FUND, FACTS ABOUT UNICEF 1976-1977 (1977).
85. Because the governments of these LDCs would not have control over BDF revenue,
some funds might be used to counteract their objectionable domestic policies. BDFs thereby
have an advantage over traditional DC foreign aid programs, which ordinarily transfer
resources, directly or indirectly, to LDC governments. These governments usually seek to
maintain the status quo and have no inclination to use foreign aid to effectuate funda-
mental changes that might threaten their own entrenched positions. Even worse, some
suspect that DC foreign aid often finds its way into the pockets of the LDC's ruling elite.
As Professor Richard Gardner states bluntly: -[T]he people of the United States are not
interested in transferring wealth from the poor people in rich countries to the rich people
in poor countries." NEw STRucruas Pop ECoNoMIC INTERDEPENnENCE 53 (R. Gardner
ed. 1975). To the extent that BDFs can pursue their spending objectives without the
cooperation of the LDC government, they have the potential for encouraging social and
economic reforms.
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reason, earmarking should increase the acceptability of the different
revenue-raising proposals.
Although BDFs could be organized and operated unilaterally by the
DCs, their widespread creation and adoption could be stimulated by
specific international action. One approach would be for an inter-
national organization, such as the United Nations, to promulgate
guidelines or set forth models for the organization of brain drain funds.
BDFs satisfying those guidelines could then be chartered under the
domestic laws of various countries. United Nations resolutions or
conventions might recommend that BDFs be created in accordance
with the models or guidelines. Or, the United Nations could expand the
authority of some existing group, such as UNICEF, so that it could
organize a special division to operate one or more BDFs.
B. Tax Incentives for Voluntary Contributions
Because controversy surrounds the causes and effects of the brain drain,
the justice of any proposal that uses the tax system in a coercive
manner, such as Professor Bhagwati's tax on PTKs, will be strongly
challenged. In preparing the discussion draft for the Bellagio confer-
ence and the report for UNCTAD, the authors therefore sought an
alternative means of raising revenue, one that would be less contro-
versial. Accordingly, the authors proposed that funds be raised through
voluntary contributions. No doubt some individuals, in recognition of
a moral obligation, could be expected to make such contributions.
Similarly, business firms that actively recruit or employ LDC profes-
sionals might also donate.
The motivation to make voluntary contributions could be enhanced
by offering tax advantages to donors. Two of the incentives that can
be used are tax deductions and tax credits."" Tax deductions are
offered as an incentive for charitable contributions 7 in some DCs,
86. Much debate has centered around the propriety of using tax incentives to encourage
charitable contributions. This controversy has spawned a voluminous literature. For a
small sampling, see FILER COMMISSION,, GIVING IN AMERIGA: TOWARD A STRoNGER VOLUN-
TARY SECToR, REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PU3LIC NEEDS
(r975); S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAx REFORM 223-32 (1973); TAx INSTITUTE OF
AmERmcA, TAx IMPAcTs ON PHILANTRMOPY (1972); Andrews, Personal Deductions in an
Ideal Income Tax, 86 HAxV. L. REv. 309, 344-75 (1972); Bittker, Charitable Contribu-
tions: Tax Deductions or Matching Grants?, 28 TAx L. REV. 37 (1973); McDaniel,
Federal Matching Grants for Charitable Contributions: A Substitute for the Income Tax
Deduction, 27 TAx L. REV. 377 (1972).
87. Professor Andrews would object to characterizing the deduction for charitable
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for example, the United States,8s Canada,"9 and France9" (but not the
United Kingdom). Individuals and corporations in those countries are
allowed to deduct from their taxable income9" the amount contributed
to qualifying charitable organizations9 2 Under a progressive personal
income tax, the greater an individual's income, the higher the rate of
tax paid on marginal increments of income. Therefore, the greater the
income, the larger the tax saving produced by a deduction for a chari-
table contribution. For example, an individual in the 20% marginal tax
bracket who deducts a $ioo contribution realizes a tax saving of $20,
whereas an individual in the 30% bracket realizes a tax saving of $30
from deducting the same amount. In other words, the greater an
individual's income, the greater the tax inducement to donate to quali-
fying charitable institutions.
93
A tax incentive may also be provided in the form of a direct reduc-
tion in the income tax otherwise due, rather than in the form of a
deduction from income. Such a reduction, which is called a tax credit,
might, for example, be equal to 20% of the amount donated. For any
person donating $ioo, such a credit would produce a tax saving of $20,
regardless of his marginal tax bracket. Thus, tax credits give equal tax
benefits to taxpayers contributing the same amounts, whereas tax
contributions as a tax incentive. According to Professor Andrews, the deduction can be
defended as a refinement of the notion of an ideal personal income tax. See Andrews,
supra note 86, at 344-75.
88. LR.C. § 17o.
89. [1978] CAr. MASTER TAX GumE (CCH) ff 8070.
9o. L. HALPERN, TAxEs IN FRANCE 67 (1974).
9i. This discussion concentrates on the income tax. Once the principle of using tax
incentives to encourage contributions to BDFs has been established for the income tax,
similar techniques could be extended to the estate and gift tax.
92. The amount qualifying for the deduction is typically subject to a ceiling. For ex-
ample, in the United States, the ceiling for contributions by individuals is 50%, 30%, or
20% of the taxpayer's contribution base (which is usually adjusted gross income),
depending on the nature of the contribution, the identity of the recipient organization,
the form in which the contribution is made, and the use made of the contributions by the
recipient. Corporations are subject to a ceiling of 5% of taxable income (computed with
certain adjustments). I.R.C. § 170. For a short summary of the complex statutory rules,
see S. SURREY, V. WARREN, P. McDANIEL & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION, VOL.
I, at 579-85 (1972). For a general discussion, see H. BO.6AERT, TAX PROBLEMS OF Cu-
TURAL FOUNDATIONS AND OF PATRONAGE IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (1976).
93. For an analysis of the effect of the United States deduction for charitable contribu-
tions on the aggregate amount of donations, see Feldstein, The Income Tax and Charitable
Contributions, 28 NAT'L TAx J. 81, 209 (1975); Feldstein & Clotfelter, Tax Incentives and
Charitable Contributions in the United States, 5 J. PuB. ECoN. 1 (1976); Schwartz, Per-
sonal Philanthropic Contributions, 78 J. POL. ECoN. 1264 (,97o); Taussig, Economic
Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable Contributions, 2o NAT'L
TAx . 1 (1967).
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deductions give larger tax benefits to high-income taxpayers than to
low-income taxpayers. 4
Ironically, tax incentives for charitable contributions would have
little impact on certain individuals who represent a significant propor-
tion of the brain drain - employees of international organizations, such
as the United Nations, the World Bank, and the International Mone-
tary Fund. The laws of most DCs exempt the wages and salaries of
these employees from taxation;' many of them will therefore have
little, if any, DC tax liability that can be affected by the use of tax
incentives 6 Although some of these employees would contribute even
without tax inducements, 7 the revenue potential of donations from
this large and generally well-paid group is so great that the use of
special incentives should still be explored. Perhaps the International
Civil Service Commission's complex scheme for compensating these
employees could be adjusted to account for their donations. Or, if a
United Nations tax on PTKs s is adopted and extended to these
employees, then a credit could be given against this tax for a portion of
their contributions. Approaches similar to these could be examined by
the International Civil Service Commission.
The funds produced by voluntary contributions could be a major
source of revenue for BDFs. The use of tax incentives to encourage
donations has a number of appealing features. First, the contributions
are entirely voluntary. In a political sense, this approach is therefore
94. A taxpayer could be given a choice, under specified limitations, of claiming the
donation as a deduction from his income or of crediting a percentage of the donation
against his liability. Cf. I.R.C. § 41, 218 (taxpayers given choice between credit and
deduction for political contributions). The deduction for political contributions has been
repealed by the Revenue Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-600, § X13(a), 92 Stat. 2763
(repealing I.R.C. § 218) (1977 version)).
95. In the United States, employees of a foreign government are also exempt if the
foreign government provides a similar exemption for employees of the United States
government. The exemption is not available to United States citizens unless they are also
citizens of the Philippines. The exemption applies only to wages, fees, and salaries received
for services performed for the international organization or for the foreign government.
I.R.C. § 893.
96. The tax incentive would be valuable only to an employee who had substantial
amounts of unearned income which was taxable by the DC. See note 95 supra. Although
the discussion in the text focuses on tax incentives adopted by DCs, LDCs could adopt
similar provisions. A PTK who emigrated to a DC would ordinarily be outside the tax
jurisdiction of his former LDC, however. See section II(C) (s) infra. Therefore, unless the
PTK had unearned income from LDC sources which was taxable by the LDC, an LDO
tax incentive would not be effective.
97. In Geneva, United Nations employees have formed a "i% club," in which members
pledge to donate i% of their salaries for developmental purposes.
98. See section IH(D) infra.
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more attractive than a coercive measure, such as a tax on PTK income.
Second, a concerned DC can unilaterally create a BDF and adopt its
own set of incentives to encourage donations, 99 and no concerted inter-
national action is necessarily required. 00 Third, the principle of using
incentives to encourage contributions is already accepted in many DCs.
These DCs can extend existing measures to BDFs without traumatic
changes in their laws. Including them within the group of qualifying
charitable organizations is a reasonable means of accommodating the
special preferences of PTKs and other interested persons. In the United
States, for example, BDFs could easily be created under existing law.
Indeed, charitable organizations already exist for the purpose of chan-
neling funds for use abroad. 10 ' Fourth, the taxpayers qualifying for
tax benefits need not be restricted to PTKs resident in the DCs. Any
person, organization, or corporation could be eligible for the tax incen-
tives. Non-LDC individuals and business firms, in recognition of
moral obligations or of economic benefits received from the brain
drain, might therefore make donations.
C. LDC Taxation of Emigrant PTKs
Professor Bhagwati's proposal to levy a special tax on the earnings of
PTKs who emigrate from the LDCs to the DCs °2 was vigorously
99. The revenue loss resulting from the adoption of a tax incentive for contributions to
a BDF could be regarded as a contribution by the host DC and creditable against a
United Nations assessment on the DC, discussed in section 11(E) infra. Measuring the
amount of revenue loss, however, is complicated. Multiplying the amount of a contribu-
tion by the donor's marginal tax bracket would overstate the revenue loss to the extent
that BDFs merely divert donations that would have gone to other charitable organizations.
1oo. If international action were desirable, the United Nations could easily incorporate
the use of tax incentives for charitable contributions into any program it adopted for
encouraging BDFs. The United Nations could, for example, survey existing practices to
determine the full variety of tax techniques available for inducing charitable donations.
The United Nations could then recommend model legislation which countries, especially
those not familiar with tax incentives for contributions, could be encouraged to adopt.
See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL STANDING CONFERENCE ON PHILANTI-ROPY [INTERPHIL], DRAr
EUROpEAN CoNvaNTioN ON ThE TAx TREATMENT IN RESPECT OF CERTAIN NoN-PRoFrr
OROANIZATONS (1971).
ior. The United States is somewhat unusual, however, in allowing a deduction for
charitable contributions even where the recipient organization transfers funds abroad.
Most other countries require that the recipient organization use the contributions domes-
tically in order for the donor to be eligible for tax benefits. For the United States rules,
see Rev. Rul. 66-79, 1966-1 C.B. 48; Rev. Rul. 71-46o; 1971-2 C.B. 231.
102. This proposal should not be confused with an exit tax, which would be paid at
the time of emigration. Because an exit tax is levied on the emigrant only once, it typically
involves a payment of some magnitude. In a country in which private savings are not
substantial, an exit tax can effectively prohibit emigration, unless the individual has access
to foreign capital through friends or relatives abroad. The proposed tax, unlike an exit
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debated at the recent UNCTAD conference, where it was warmly
received by the LDC participants. 10 3 The LDCs saw the tax as a way
in which a PTK can partially satisfy his obligation to contribute to his
country's development. The LDCs compared the salaries and living
conditions enjoyed by PTKs in the DCs with those existing at home
and concluded that emigrant PTKs clearly have the economic capacity
to bear an additional tax burden. The LDCs also felt that the DCs
have both the obligation and the capability to assist in administering a
special tax on emigrant PTKs. These views were not shared by the
DCs, however, which were concerned that the proposed tax would
have an adverse effect on emigration.104 Many DCs felt that any
hindrance to emigration was unacceptable if that emigration was
tax, would be levied annually, only after emigration had already occurred. If the rates
were chosen carefully, the tax would probably not affect levels of emigration. See note
104 infra.
103. According to Professor Bhagwati, his proposal has been warmly received at various
third world congresses and conferences. Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 4 n.8. He concludes:
[T]he proposal appealed to the moral instincts of LDC intellectuals at many levels.
Thus it seemed fair that those who were skilled and emigrated should share some of
their gains with the LDC-world they came from, much the way that progressive
taxation redistributed some income from the rich to the poor within a nation. Further,
it seemed like an attractive "link" proposal to raise revenue for developmental spend-
ing in the LDCs when the foreign aid flows were declining .... [Ilt was a "global
tax," with DCs ... and LDCs involved in a concerted tax effort under international
auspices, and this made the tax proposal an eminently appropriate policy option for
inclusion on the agenda for a new international economic order which recognized
the interdependence of LDCs and DCs and the consequent necessity for coordinated
policy measures.
Id. at 4-5.
104. Economists claim that the tax is unlikely to have any significant impact on
emigration. E.g., Krugman & Bhagwati, supra note 43; Lucas, supra note 9; Psacharopou-
los, supra note 43. The various restrictions that each DC imposes on entry may already re-
duce immigration to a level below what would have existed in the absence of all controls.
Thus, the tax may affect only the size of the waiting list, that is, the excess demand
for entry into a DC, not the actual level of immigration. The effect of the tax on immigra-
tion levels must be distinguished, however, from the effect of the tax on an individual's
decision to emigrate. A reduction in the size of the waiting lists would indicate that the
tax had discouraged some individuals from attempting to emigrate.
Regardless of its impact on a PTK's decision to migrate, the tax may affect an LDC's
emigration policies. If, for example, the revenue from a tax on PTKs were substantial, an
LDC might decide to encourage emigration, or at least not encourage PTKs who were
abroad to return home.
Professor Bhagwati pointedly suggests that persons worried about the effect of the tax
on immigration should address their concerns to the DC governments and their restrictive
immigration practices. Bhagwati, supra note 27, at 25. To be sure, DC immigration
restrictions may raise philosophical problems similar to those raised by restrictions on
emigration. Emigration and immigration restrictions differ, however, in at least one
important way. Because immigration laws vary from country to country, an individual
prevented from entering the DC of his choice may be able to obtain entry to some other
DC. That option would obviously be precluded if the tax had the effect of preventing
an individual from leaving the LDC at all.
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occurring in response to such push factors as political or religious
persecution or a lack of career opportunities. They compared PTKs
with other DC residents and questioned the ability of the PTKs to bear
any additional tax liability.0 5
No simple way of resolving these differences 06 in perception and
outlook exists, because they reflect the fundamental moral, political,
and philosophical conflict between the internationalist and the nation-
alist models of the brain drain. Differences in perspective could, how-
ever, be minimized by a tax on emigrant PTKs which conformed to
already existing patterns of taxation. Notwithstanding the novelty of
advocating an income tax as a tool for intervening in the brain drain,
an LDC tax on the earnings of emigrant PTKs can be so designed
that it accords with international custom and practice. Such conformity
should help increase its acceptability.
The following sections107 concentrate on the refinements necessary to
make an LDC tax feasible and acceptable under general notions of
tax equity. The first section examines the issues raised by jurisdictional
rules, that is, the rules governing the extent of a country's taxing
powers. That discussion provides the background necessary for under-
standing how the imposition of an LDC tax on emigrants would
io5. But compare the reaction of Professor Saul Mendlovitz. Professor Mendlovitz did
not attend the UNCTAD conference but, as President of the Institute for World Order,
he was instrumental in arranging the Bellagio conference, where the tax proposals were
first discussed in an international setting.
[T]he notion of taxing individuals from the less developed countries who earn their
income in a developed country an additional increment beyond what they had to pay
within that host society seemed to me odd and in some ways, quite frankly, offensive;
it seemed eminently unfair. My initial reaction, then, was that those of us involved
in promoting the general principle of a more equitable share of wealth and power
to the peoples of the less developed areas of the world would be better advised to
identify projects for political mobilization that would have more immediate popular
appeal and possibly greater political and financial payoffs. The more I discussed the
matter.., however, the more convinced I became that this was a valuable exercise
.. It was an attempt... to fix a systematic and continuous obligation rather than
leave to chance and the good will of individuals any financial contribution which
they wished to make. The possibility that such a tax might have a demonstrative
impact for citizens of developed countries to behave more responsibly and generously
toward the Third World Countries . . . ought to be taken into consideration ....
Finally,... the project might justifiably be seen as a pioneering effort in the direction
of a global tax system . . . . [F]or genuine global civilization . . . it is necessary
to think carefully of some form of global governance. Or, to put the matter more
succinctly: global taxation for global civilization.
VOL. I, supra note 2, Foreword, at xi, xii-xii.
io6. These differences in perspective were anticipated in Oldman & Pomp, supra note
77, at 752.
107. These sections draw upon id. at 754-61.
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comport with existing practice. The remaining sections identify prob-
lems of implementation, administration, and enforcement.
i. Jurisdictional Issues
The currently observed rules of tax jurisdiction are evolved rules
in the sense that certain patterns of taxation have become acceptable
as a matter of international custom. These patterns are not an indica-
tion of the outer boundaries of a country's tax jurisdiction, however,
because governments have not, so far, tended to assert their powers
broadly. This exercise of self-restraint is attributable both to the prac-
ticalities of enforcement and to the fear that a sweeping assertion of
jurisdiction might offend other nations. The full extent of national
tax jurisdiction is therefore undefined. 08 Some aspects of an LDC tax
on emigrant PTKs involve an assertion of taxing powers which exceeds
current practice and thus pose jurisdictional questions to which only
sketchy and tentative responses can be given.
International custom suggests that some minimum connection or
nexus should exist between the country asserting jurisdiction and the
taxpayer or the income being taxed.'09 The nature of this nexus varies
from country to country, and a country's tax system can be classified
as either schedular or global (unitary) according to the nexus em-
ployed. The most limited form of tax jurisdiction is that asserted by a
country whose system is purely schedular. The only jurisdictional
nexus in a purely schedular system is the source of the income;
10
the personal status of the taxpayer is irrelevant. A country with a
schedular system taxes income from domestic sources regardless of
the taxpayer's status;"' income from foreign sources is exempt.
io8. Compare Norr, jurisdiction to Tax and International Income, 17 TAx L. Rav. 341
(1962) with Ross, United States Taxation of Aliens and Foreign Corporations: The For-
eign Investors Tax Act of z966 and Related Developments, 22 TAx L. Rav. 279, 363
(1967). Many countries are parties -to bilateral tax treaties. An objective of these tax
treaties is to reach agreement on the acceptable scope of each country's tax jurisdiction.
Nontax conventions can also affect a country's tax jurisdiction in special situations, The
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, opened for signature Apr. s8, 1961, 23
U.S.T. 3227, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, 6oo U.N.T.S. 95, for example, provides a tax exemption
in the country of employment for income earned by foreign diplomats.
iog. Norr, supra note io8, at 432.
i1o. Id. at 434.
ii. Different types of domestic income may be taxed in different ways. Commission to
Study the Fiscal System of Venezuela, Schedular and Global Income Taxes, in R. Bitz &
0. OLD AN, READINGS ON TAXATIoN IN DaEVaLOPINo CUNTRIES 132 (2d ed. 1967). The
personal status of the taxpayer may also be relevant in determining the rate applied to the
income.
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In contrast, a country employing a global system asserts jurisdiction
either on the basis of the source of the income or on the basis of the
status of the taxpayer. Under most global systems, residence is the
necessary personal status, but a few countries, including the United
States, Mexico, and the Philippines, use citizenship.Y" Countries that
rely on citizenship do, however, tax noncitizens on the basis of resi-
dence." 3 In other words, either status- citizenship or residence-is
sufficient for the assertion of tax jurisdiction in these countries. The
global approach focuses on an individual's ability to pay, which is
measured by his total income, regardless of its source. Both domestic
and foreign income are taxed if the necessary personal connection exists.
The differences between schedular and global systems provide a
framework for analyzing the imposition of an LDC tax on emigrant
PTKs. In a schedular system, the only nexus is the source of the in-
come, and, thus, no tax jurisdiction is asserted over foreign income. An
LDC that uses a schedular system will, therefore, not tax any income
earned abroad by an emigrant PTK. If an LDC uses a global system,
jurisdiction to tax income earned abroad depends on the personal
status of the PTK. If the LDC asserts jurisdiction on the basis of
citizenship, it will tax income earned abroad by PTKs who are LDC
nationals. If the LDC asserts jurisdiction on the basis of residence, but
not citizenship, it will tax the income earned abroad by emigrant PTKs
only if -they are considered LDC residents for tax purposes.
At one time, most LDCs relied on a purely schedular approach, but,
today, the trend is to adopt the global approach.'14 LDCs that have
112. Hirsh & Rodriguez, Taxation - United States Expatriates - Foreign Earned
Income Act of 1978, 59 HAv. INT'L L.J. 633, 639-40 (1978); see Sherbaniuk, Hutcheon
& Brissenden, Liability for Tax - Residence, Domicile or Citizenship?, in REPORT OF
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SEvENTEENTH ANNuAL TAX CONFERENCE 315 (Can. Tax Founda-
tion x964). For an argument supporting the principle of citizenship jurisdiction, see
Bhagwati, supra note 68.
113. The United States, for example, generally taxes both United States citizens and
residents on their worldwide income. Treas. Reg. § i.i-i(b), T.D. 7332, 1975-I C.B.
2o6; Treas, Reg. § 1.871-1 (a), T.D. 7332, 1975-I C.B. 2o9. But see note 127 infra.
114. As the income tax becomes more significant in the fiscal structure of a country,
the problems of measuring and comparing the ability to pay of one individual with
another increase in importance. Attention logically shifts to the individual's total income,
regardless of its source; hence, a country can be expected to move in the direction of a
global system. Pressure to adopt a global system also increases as foreign investment
grows, because a country usually wants to tap this potential source of revenue. Also,
the taxation of foreign income tends to reduce domestic capital shortages; if foreign in-
come were not taxed, individuals and corporations would have an incentive to invest
abroad. Stated another way, the extension of a country's tax system to foreign income
maintains tax neutrality in that a decision to invest abroad rather than at home will be
unaffected by domestic tax considerations. Economists argue that tax neutrality leads to a
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adopted a global approach are already able to tax those PTKs who
have the necessary personal status. In practice, though, few of these
LDCs tax emigrant PTKs because they rely on residence as their
jurisdictional nexus. Countries vary widely in their definition of resi-
dence, some defining it on the basis of the period of time the individual
has been within or without the country and others on the basis of the
intent of the individual in being abroad, the nature of his contacts at
home and abroad, and so forth. Despite the number of acceptable
approaches to defining "resident," "" emigrants are not likely to fall
within any of the more usual definitions." An LDC using a global
system based on residence is therefore unlikely to assert jurisdiction
over PTKs, who will have been abroad for some time, because the
requisite jurisdictional nexus will have ceased to exist.
more efficient allocation of capital. See, e.g., P. MUSGRAVE, UNITED STATES TAXATION 017
FOREIGN INVESTMENT INCOME: ISSUES AND ARGUMENTS 109-10 (1969). It is tempting to
extrapolate from this principle and argue that LDC taxation of PTKs abroad maintains
tax neutrality and is economically efficient. See, e.g., Hamada, Taxing the Brain Drain:
A Global Point of View, in THE NEw INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: TuE NotTi-
SOUTH DEBATE (J. Bhagwati ed. 1977). The meaning of neutrality is harder to discern,
however, if a PTK is living abroad (rather than living at home, and investing abroad),
because the LDC's tax rates are designed in the context of the LDC's cost of living, salary
levels, and distribution of income. These rates may not be appropriate for a PTK in a
DC, even if the LDC provides relief from double taxation. See section (II) (C) (3) inlra.
It is unclear what type of LDC rate structure is required by the neutrality principle, or
whether a special rate structure might have to be designed for each DC.
Despite the advantages of a global system, some LDCs continue to exempt foreign
income. A handful of these LDCs deliberately exempt foreign income in order to increase
their attractiveness as tax havens. Other LDCs may lack the administrative capability to
tax foreign income. Still other LDCs may have limited themselves to taxing domestic
income at a point in their history when few taxpayers were receiving foreign income.
Although some taxpayers in those countries may recently have begun to receive large
amounts of foreign income, these taxpayers, as a group, may be able to prevent a change
in the law.
115. A country may have one set of rules for determining when an individual becomes
a resident and another set of rules for determining when an individual ceases to be a
resident. The definition of resident for citizens or nationals may also be different from
the definition for aliens. For illustrations of the approaches used by some countries, see
HAtvAuRD LAw SCHOOL, TAXATION IN AUSTRALIA 5/ (Int'l Tax Program, World Tax
Ser. 1958); HARVARD LAw SCHOOL, TAXATION IN COLOMBIA XI/I (Int'l Tax Program,
World Tax Ser. 1964); HARvARo LAw SCHOOL, TAxATION IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF
GRMANsY 5/1 (Int'l Tax Program, World Tax Ser. 1969); HARVARD LAW SCHOOL,
TA ATION IN FRANCE ii/i (Int'l Tax Program, World Tax Ser. 1966); HARvARD LAw
SCHOOL, TAxAToN IN SWEDEN 5/I (Int'l Tax Program, World Tax Ser. 1959).
1x6. Regardless of the approach a country adopts in defining resident for tax purposes,
a basic question arises: at what point does a PTK working abroad cease being a resident
of his LDC of origin? A PTK who was sent abroad by his employer for short-term
training would dearly remain a resident of the LDC. But the PTKs whom the tax
proposal is intended to reach - those who have emigrated abroad - are not likely to
fall within normal concepts of residence.
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In order to tax emigrant PTKs, an LDC could adopt an idiosyncratic
definition of residence, one that relied heavily on a person's prior
contacts with the country, notwithstanding the severance of those con-
tacts upon emigration. Such a definition could specify the maximum
period of time (perhaps, five years) within which an emigrant would
continue to be considered a resident. Although this approach might
appear reasonable in some respects, it does deviate from international
custom and practice and could pose two problems. First, the LDC's
assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of its idiosyncratic definition would
conflict with the DC's own claim of residence jurisdiction, and the DC
would therefore probably refuse to recognize the LDC definition.
The DC's cooperation in policing the LDC tax, which is essential if the
tax is to be enforced, 17 will obviously not be forthcoming if the DC
views the LDC's assertion of jurisdiction as illegitimate or extreme.
Second, an emigrant PTK who has severed his connections with his
LDC of origin will regard the LDC's claim of residence as unjust or
unfair even before the five years have elapsed. Under these circum-
stances, his voluntary compliance with the tax is improbable.
To avoid the problems arising from an unorthodox definition of
residence, an LDC could assert jurisdiction on the basis of citizen-
ship,"" as the United States, Mexico, and the Philippines do." 9 This
117. See section (II) (C) (4) infra.
I8. In some LDCs, such as Britain's former colonies in Africa, the brain drain may
consist of PTKs who are not citizens of the LDC. Relying solely on citizenship as the
basis for jurisdiction would obviously not reach such PTKs.
An LDC's assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship might also be viewed as
creating a conflict with the host DC's jurisdiction. The short answer is that countries
accept certain conflicts as legitimate and inevitable. The conflict between citizenship
jurisdiction and residence jurisdiction is, by custom and practice, considered acceptable.
Income tax treaties between nations with citizenship jurisdiction and residence jurisdic-
tion, e.g., Convention on Double Taxation, July 28, 1967, United States-France, I9 U.S.T.
528o, T.I.A.S. No. 6518, illustrate implicit acceptance of this conflict. The conflict created
by a deviant definition of resident would probably, however, be considered illegitimate.
In some countries, the taxation of the foreign earnings of a nonresident citizen may
conflict with constitutional doctrines proscribing legislation having an extraterritorial
effect. For example, some Canadian constitutional law scholars felt that prior to 1931,
Canada was precluded from enacting legislation having an extraterritorial effect and
could not tax the foreign income of nonresident citizens. In 1931, the Canadian Parlia-
ment passed the Statute of Westminster, which expressly authorized such legislation. The
Statute of Westminster, IV CAN. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 8 (1970), clearly established the
power to tax nonresident citizens on their foreign income, though Canada has never
chosen to exercise this power. Sherbaniuk, Hutcheon & Brissenden, supra note i2, at 316.
'i9. These three countries apply citizenship jurisdiction uniformly to all citizens.
Limiting citizenship jurisdiction to PTKs would be unprecedented and might violate
certain human rights guaranteed under international law. For a discussion of possible
conflicts with rights guaranteed under international law, see Newman, The Brain Drain
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approach is risky, however, if the PTKs do not value their LDC
nationality highly. An LDC's assertion of jurisdiction on the basis of
citizenship might simply induce emigrant PTKs to renounce their citi-
zenship. Wholesale renunciations of citizenship would obviously not
be in the interests of the LDC: not only would a loss in tax revenue
result, but, more important, the probability of these PTKs ever return-
ing home would also be reduced.
Formulating an approach that would minimize a PTK's ability to
avoid the LDC tax by renouncing his citizenship is difficult. Under
international law, could the LDC ignore a PTK's renunciation of
citizenship ?120 Or, could renunciation be ignored at least until the
PTK had obtained a new citizenship ?121 Should an LDC eliminate
the tax incentive to renounce citizenship by levying its tax only for the
period of time a PTK must normally wait before becoming a DC
citizen? An immigrant to the United States, for example, must
normally wait five years before becoming a citizen. 2 2 If the LDC tax
were to apply only for five years, a PTK immigrating to the United
States would have nothing to gain from renouncing his LDC citizen-
ship during this period. An LDC tax limited to a five-year period,
however, will obviously not produce as much revenue as a tax imposed
over a PTK's lifetime. Moreover, revenues will be lower because some
PTKs spend their early years in a DC in schooling or in low-income
jobs. Further, a sophisticated PTK might intentionally work under a
Tax and International Human Rights Law, in VoL. 1, supra note 2, at x87. An LDC's
domestic law may also prevent the singling out of PTKs for special tax treatment. Other
reasons for not limiting the tax to PTKs are discussed in the context of a United Nations
t=x. See section II(D) (r) infra.
12o. The United States has a provision designed to discourage tax-motivated renuncia-
tions of citizenship. I.R.C. § 877. In general, this provision allows the United States to
disregard a tax-motivated renunciation of citizenship for up to so years. The provision
applies, however, only for the purpose of taxing United States investment income and
income effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United
States. Foreign income, such as that earned from services performed outside the United
States, is not subjected to tax by this provision. The United States rule, therefore, is not
precedent for the situation discussed here which concerns income earned abroad.
121. Two situations can be distinguished. A PTK who renounces his LDC citizenship
can either acquire a new citizenship or become stateless. The LDC's assertion of tax
jurisdiction over a PTK who has acquired citizenship in a DC would raise the same
problems as an idiosyncratic definition of resident. In contrast, an LDC policy that
discouraged persons from becoming stateless in order to avoid taxation would be reason-
able since statelessness is generally discouraged under international law. Weis, The United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Il INTL' & Comp. L.Q. io73
(x962).
122. Under certain conditions, for example, marriage to a United States citizen, the
waiting period may be less than five years.
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deferred compensation agreement in order to reduce his income during
the five-year period.
Although no single solution to the possibility that PTKs would
renounce their citizenship appears satisfactory, not all LDCs would
have to worry about massive renunciations. One reason is that an
emigrant PTK is likely to be influenced by his native cultural and
social patterns, and the strength of his ties to the LDC may therefore
outweigh tax avoidance motives. Another is that some PTKs may be
too uncertain about their future plans to risk surrendering their LDC
citizenship. Renunciation will also be unattractive to a PTK whose
family members have remained in the LDC. In addition, the financial
burden of the LDC tax will directly affect the PTK's decision about
maintaining his LDC citizenship. Although some PTKs would find
any LDC tax offensive, a tax that imposed only a modest burden would
probably not provide a strong inducement to renunciation.
12 3
2. Necessary Adaptations of LDC Tax Law
All countries that levy an income tax must design a set of rules and
principles for determining a taxpayer's liability, but no two countries
employ identical rules and principles. That differences exist is not sur-
prising, however, because the calculation of taxable income involves a
great variety of transactions and types of receipts: capital gains, royal-
ties, deferred compensation, stock options, annuities, insurance pro-
ceeds, inheritances, alimony, depreciation, charitable contributions,
business expenses, and so forth.124 Little agreement exists, even in theory,
123. The United States is probably more successful in enforcing its assertion of citizen-
ship jurisdiction than most countries would be. Many United States citizens working
outside the country alternate periods abroad with periods within the United States, and
their awareness that they will eventually return home is likely to offset any inclinations
they have to ignore their United States tax obligations. In addition, the Internal Revenue
Service (IRS) stations personnel abroad as part of its Office of International Operations,
and this IRS presence encourages taxpayer compliance. Moreover, United States citizens
value their citizenship highly and are unlikely to renounce it for tax reasons. In any
event, the IRS is empowered, to a certain extent, to ignore tax-motivated renunciations. See
note 120 supra.
124. Some of these receipts would ordinarily be classified as unearned income. It is
unclear whether Professor Bhagwati, in his proposal to tax emigrant PTKs, intended to
draw a distinction between earned income, i.e., income that represents compensation for
services, and unearned income, i.e., income that represents a return on capital. The
discussion in sections H(C) and HI(D) ignore this distinction. First, the difference between
earned and unearned income is often a blurry one. For example, capital gains, which are
usually classified as unearned income, may result from the sale of assets that embody
an element of personal services, such as patents, copyrights, or stock in small personal
service corporations; the sale proceeds therefore represent, in part, compensation for
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about the normative treatment of many income and expense items, but,
even if agreement were to exist, political, social, economic, and admin-
istrative constraints could necessitate greatly divergent approaches.
The rules and principles for determining an individual's tax liability
reflect the complexity and sophistication of a country's business trans-
actions and employment practices. Before extending its jurisdiction to
emigrant PTKs, an LDC must therefore examine its tax law carefully
in order to determine whether it can cope with the sophisticated busi-
ness conditions in the DCs. Because most LDCs have had little experi-
ence in taxing individuals abroad, previously unrecognized weaknesses
in the LDC tax law may be exposed for the first time.
A number of potential problems can be anticipated. 25 One is that
many of the transactions and practices that are common in the DCs
occur infrequently or have no parallel or counterpart in the LDCs,
and their tax consequences may therefore not be specified in the tax
laws of the LDCs. An emigrant PTK can be expected to interpret
ambiguities or lacunae in the LDC law in his favor, and many of his
transactions in the DC will therefore not enter into the determination
of his liability for the LDC tax. For example, the LDC law may not
treat pensions, profit-sharing plans, or deferred compensation arrange-
ments that are available to PTKs employed in the DCs. The LDC
will be forced to develop policies for dealing with these and other
situations not specifically covered in its law, an effort that may not be
justified in view of more pressing domestic priorities. One alternative
is for the LDC to surrender complete control over defining its own tax
base and to defer to the DC's definition of taxable income. Taking
this approach, the LDC would levy its tax on the amount of taxable
income computed by the PTK for DC tax purposes.'
services. S. SurREY, NV. WAIusEN, P. McDANIEL & H. AuLT, supra note 92, at 1173-76.
Second, Professor Bhagwati's proposal was clearly intended to reach at least earned income.
Its rationale can logically be extended to income received as a return on invested capital
if that capital was originally received as compensation for services. Third, an LDC is
deprived of the use of this capital to the extent it is invested in a DC, in much the same
way that the LDC is deprived of the human capital represented by the PTK himself.
Fourth, the administrative effort involved in implementing the proposals, discussed in
sections R(C) and II(D), is greatly reduced if there is no need to distinguish between
earned and unearned income.
125. These problems would also be encountered if the tax on emigrant PTKs were
levied by the United Nations and the United Nations chose to design a special tax base,
rather than relying on the host DC's tax base. See section II(D) (2) infra.
i26. Deferring to the DC's tax base is proposed in the context of a United Nations tax
on PTKs. See section II(D)(2) infra. If the PTK were to return home eventually, a
difficult problem would be raised by the need to integrate LDC tax law with the prior
application of DC tax law.
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klthough one type of problem arises if the LDC tax law does not
adequately treat transactions common in the DC, a different type of
problem arises if rules developed in the context of conditions prevailing
in the LDC are extended to persons abroad. For example, some LDCs
place a ceiling on the absolute amount of certain expenses, such as
advertising, travel, or entertainment, which can be deducted for tax
purposes. Because the ceiling will have been established on the basis of
LDC price levels and business customs, it may be totally unrealistic
for a PTK working in a DC. Even if the ceiling is expressed as a per-
centage of income - io% of sales revenue for advertising expenses, for
example -the percentage may be grossly out of line with DC prac-
tices. The same problem is raised by provisions of LDC tax law
which adjust an individual's tax liability in recognition of the size of
his family. This adjustment is often made by allowing the taxpayer to
deduct a fixed amount for each member of his family. The amount set
by the LDC law may, however, be inappropriate for a taxpayer and his
family who are abroad, because the amount is based on living condi-
tions at home.
The LDC tax law must be examined not only to identify provisions
that are inadequate for individuals abroad, but also to identify pro-
visions that offer them unintentional benefits. For example, many
LDCs provide generous capital allowances and other incentives, with
the intention of encouraging domestic investment. When these pro-
visions were introduced, investment in capital assets abroad may have
been uncommon, or the LDC may not have taxed foreign income.
Consequently, no thought was given to denying these incentives to
foreign investment. Provisions such as these would therefore have to
be identified and redrafted in order to eliminate unintended effects.
A final problem can arise if the cost of living is much greater in the
DC than in the LDC. In this case, the LDC might wish to extend
PTKs resident abroad special deductions not available to taxpayers
resident within the LDC. These deductions could, for example, take
into account a PTK's higher cost of housing, special costs incurred in
educating his children, and so forth'27
127. Although the United States applies a global approach based on citizenship jurisdic-
tion, its taxpayers abroad are granted a number of special reliefs not available to taxpayers
resident within the country. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 911. This tax treatment was recently
modified to provide relief explicitly for certain special burdens imposed on individuals
abroad, such as their higher cost of living. Foreign Earned Income Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-615, 92 Stat. 3097 (codified in scattered sections of the I.R.C.). For a more corn-
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The extent to which the LDC law requires modification will depend
on the experience of the LDC in taxing individuals abroad and on
differences in business and employment conditions in the DC and the
LDC. It will also, however, depend on the nature of the PTK's activi-
ties in the DC and whether he is self-employed or an employee. Self-
employed individuals are more likely to be involved in business
transactions and practices that have no counterpart in the LDC.
Moreover, those LDC tax provisions whose application to individuals
abroad may be troublesome, such as provisions concerning advertising,
travel, and entertainment deductions and capital allowances, will affect
self-employed individuals more than employees. The problems asso-
ciated with these provisions might not be significant if the LDC's
brain drain consisted primarily of employees, rather than self-employed
persons, but even employees can present difficulties, especially if they
receive their compensation in forms uncommon in the LDC.
3. Double Taxation
International double taxation can result whenever a taxpayer or his
income has jurisdictional connections with more than one country. 2 8
Because a DC will tax income earned by a PTK within the DC, double
taxation will occur if the LDC imposes a tax on the DC income of the
PTK. No principle of international law requires a country to provide
relief from the burden of international double taxation,2 ' but most
countries that tax foreign income do provide relief in some manner.
As a matter of custom, relief from double taxation is ordinarily
achieved by the country of source being granted a prior claim to the
income. In other words, the DC tax on a PTK's DC income would
have priority over the LDC tax on the same income. A common
mechanism for giving priority to the country of source is the foreign
plete discussion of the special tax relief provided United States nonresident citizens, see
Hirsh & Rodriguez, supra note i2.
128. International double taxation often arises because one country taxes an individual
on the basis of residence or of citizenship and another country taxes the individual on the
basis of the source of his income. Double taxation can also occur if each of two or more
countries regards the individual as its resident or its national, or regards the same item of
income as arising within its territory.
129. Norr, supra note io8, at 438. Because a country need not provide relief from the
burden of double taxation, an LDC could attempt to increase its revenue by not offering
a credit for foreign taxes. If an LDC sought to reduce the economic incentive to emigrate,
it would adopt no relief provisions whatsoever. The lack of relief provisions would be
counterproductive, however, if PTKs were thereby encouraged to evade or avoid the tax.
Moreover, a DC is unlikely to assist in administering an LDC tax without some assurance
that problems of double taxation have been mitigated.
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tax credit. 3 ' After satisfying his DC tax liability, the PTK would
compute his LDC tax liability and claim against it a foreign tax credit
for the amount of DC tax paid on income earned within the DC.
To illustrate how such a foreign tax credit would operate, suppose
that, for purposes of the DC tax, a PTK has taxable income of $20,000
derived solely from employment within the DC. Assume that the DC
tax is $5,000, which represents an effective tax rate of 25%. Suppose
that, for purposes of the LDC tax, the PTK also has $20,o00 of tax-
able income.1 1 If, for example, the LDC tax is levied at an effective
rate of 45%, the PTK's LDC tax liability is $9,000. If no relief from
double taxation were provided, the PTK's earnings would be subject
to a total tax burden of $14,0oo ($5,ooo + $9,ooo), or an overall effective
tax rate of 70%. If the LDC were to grant a foreign tax credit, the
PTK would be able to claim a credit for the $5,ooo tax paid to the DC
(the country of source) and thereby lower his LDC liability from
$9,000 to $4,000. The DC would not allow the PTK a credit for any
LDC tax, because, from the DC's point of view, the PTK has no
foreign income over which the LDC has prior claim as the country of
source.'8 2 The final result is that the PTK would pay tax to the DC at
a rate of 25% and to the LDC at a rate of 2o%.'x
13o. Among the countries granting a foreign tax credit unilaterally are Canada, Greece,
India, Israel, Japan, Mexico, Pakistan, the Philippines, Turkey, the United Kingdom, the
United States, and West Germany. Other countries may agree to grant a credit only bilat-
erally, that is, only as part of a tax treaty. The United States, for example, requires its
tax treaty partners to grant a credit to their residents for income tax paid to the United
States.
Other means of eliminating or reducing double taxation include an exemption for all
foreign source income (or an exemption limited to foreign income subject to a foreign
tax), a deduction for foreign taxes, or a reduced rate of tax for foreign income.
The avoidance of double taxation is just one of a number of aims that the foreign tax
credit may serve. For a summary of the general rationales underlying the foreign tax
credit, see Note, The Foreign Tax Credit and Treatment of Payments by the Petroleum
Industry to Foreign Governments, 91 HAxv. L. tav. 844, 850-52 (1978).
13:. The LDC will determine the PTK's taxable income according to its own definition.
See section H(C) (2) supra. The LDC's determination of the PTK's taxable income need
not correspond with that of the DC.
132. If the DC wished to increase the amount of revenue collected by the LDC, it
could grant a credit for the LDC tax. In the illustration in the text, a DC credit for the
LDC tax would eliminate the DC tax liability and provide the LDC with revenue of
$9,0o0, the full LDC tax liability. The credit would, in effect, transfer $5,000 from the
DC to the LDC.
Granting a credit for a foreign tax levied on income having its source within the DC
would be contrary to current DC practices. The granting of a credit for such taxes would
be characterized not as relief from international double taxation but, rather, as foreign
aid. The use of the foreign tax credit as a means of channeling foreign aid is not unprece-
dented, at least in the United States. Note, supra note 13o, at 851-53.
133. This presentation of the foreign tax credit mechanism is a greatly simplified
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As long as the effective LDC tax rate is higher than the effective DC
rate, the foreign tax credit granted by the LDC results in tax being
paid to the LDC at a rate equal to the excess of the LDC rate over the
DC rate (20% in the illustration above). If the DC rate is higher than
the LDC rate, however, the LDC credit for taxes paid to the DC will
exceed, and therefore cancel, the LDC tax liability."8 4
Ordinarily, the LDC rate will be higher than the DC rate 30 because
most LDCs employ steeply progressive rate structures that reflect a
commitment to egalitarian principles. At each income level, the rate of
the LDC tax will probably exceed the rate of the DC tax. Another,
related factor increases the likelihood that the LDC tax will exceed
the DC tax: the difference in salary levels in the DCs and LDCs. A
salary that is no more than adequate by DC standards may be excessive
by LDC standards. Indeed, the salary differential between the DCs
and the LDCs is one of the push factors that may have inspired the
PTK to migrate. A DC salary that is generous by LDC standards will
thrust the PTK into the LDC's upper tax brackets and cause the LDC
tax to exceed the DC tax.
The application of steeply progressive LDC rates to an emigrant
PTK whose salary appears excessive by LDC standards is likely to
generate a very substantial LDC tax. Although this tax might be appro-
priate for a PTK living in the LDC, it could become confiscatory for a
PTK living in a DC in which the cost of living was much higher.
Even the use of a foreign tax credit will not eliminate the inappropriate
burden imposed by the LDC tax. For example, in the illustration
above, the foreign tax credit granted by the LDC results in the overall
tax burden on the PTK being determined by the effective LDC rate
one. Among the questions that must be answered in designing a credit are (s) what
kinds of limitations are needed to prevent the foreign tax credit from reducing the coun-
try of residence's tax on domestic income; (2) how double taxation should be dcfined;
and (3) how foreign income should be defined. The United States has developed a
sophisticated set of rules that govern the use of its foreign tax credit. For an in-depth
analysis of the United States foreign tax credit, see E. OwENs, Tih FOREIGN TAx CREDIT
(g6s); E. OWENS & G. BALL, Ti IonDECT CREDr (1979). For a shorter analysis by
Professor Michael J. McIntyre, see UNITED NATIONS DEPARTZINENT OF ECONOMIC AND
SocIAL AFFAIRS, UNITED STATES OF AmERICA: INCOME TAXATION OF PRIVATE INVESTMENTS
IN DEvELoPING CoDNTEIEs, U.N. Doc. ST/ESA/39 (1976).
134. If the rates in the illustration were reversed, the PTK would pay $9,ooo in DC
tax and credit this amount against his LDC tax of $5,ooo. Because the DC tax would
exceed the LDC tax, the LDC would receive no revenue. A DC credit for LDC taxes,
however, would change this result. See note 132 srpra.
135. Hamada, supra note 14, at 142-44, 146-47.
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of 45%. Although the credit reduces the overall tax burden on the PTK
from 70% to 45%, that 45% may still be onerous.
The most obvious solution is to develop a special schedule of rates
for emigrant PTKs. The LDC could design the schedule so that it
would always generate an LDC tax that was slightly higher than the
DC tax. In combination with an LDC credit for DC taxes, this
approach would produce some revenue for the LDC without subjecting
the PTK to an excessive tax burden. A special rate schedule would,
however, have to be designed for each host DC. An alternative, espe-
cially for an LDC that did not wish to become immersed in the com-
plexities of granting a foreign tax credit, would be to tax the income of
emigrant PTKs at low rates without providing relief from DC taxes.' 36
4. Administrative Considerations
Although the preceding discussion raises a number of problems that
must be solved before an LDC can tax emigrant PTKs, by far the
greatest obstacle faced in asserting global jurisdiction is the adminis-
trative effort that must be exerted to enforce a tax on individuals
abroad. Policing a tax on nonresidents creates problems even for the
more sophisticated tax administrations of the DCs. Because most LDCs
are not yet efficient in enforcing their taxes domestically, any attempt
to assert jurisdiction over emigrant PTKs will only increase their
administrative burdens. An LDC's lack of experience in taxing foreign
income and the low degree of voluntary compliance which can be
expected of emigrant PTKs will aggravate the problems.
A country that endeavors to tax individuals abroad is confronted
with two immediate hurdles. It must, first, obtain accurate information
about the individual's income in order to assess his tax and, then,
collect the amount of tax owed. Information about the income of an
individual abroad is often difficult to obtain, especially if the individual
fails to file a return.13 All countries apparently experience a greater
136. This approach is used by the Philippines, which levies a rate of from 1% to 3%
on the income of nationals working abroad. The problem of designing a special rate
schedule for foreign income is discussed in the context of a United Nations tax on emi-
grant PTKs. See section 1(D)(3) infra. If the LDC were willing to defer to the DC's
definition of taxable income, see text accompanying note 126 supra, it could impose its tax
as a surtax on the DC tax, which is the optimal form of a United Nations tax on PTKs.
See section H(D) (3) infra.
r37. Surr, Intertax: Intergovernmental Cooperation in Taxation, 7 HARv. INT'L L.J.
179, 203 (1966).
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degree of noncompliance with filing requirements by individuals
living outside the country. This noncompliance is partly the result of
ignorance; some individuals do not realize that their tax obligations
can continue despite their absence. A larger part of this noncompliance
can, however, be attributed to willful evasion. Physical distance
breeds a sense of security which encourages individuals to disregard
their tax obligations. Secure in the belief that his country of origin
does not have easy access to his financial affairs abroad, the individual
may see no need to file a return at all or may feel confident in filing a
return containing false information.13 s
The difficulties normally presented by individuals abroad may be
compounded if the individuals are emigrant PTKs. Although some
PTKs will feel a moral obligation to comply with LDC tax law,
perhaps in recognition of educational and other opportunities afforded
them by the LDC, many will fail to see the justice of being subjected
to a tax burden in excess of that of their DC colleagues. Moreover,
those PTKs who emigrated to escape political or social oppression may
feel no inclination to contribute to the costs of a government with
whose policies they disagree. PTKs who have emigrated because of a
lack of professional opportunities in the LDC may also be bitter. Thus,
the willingness of emigrant PTKs to comply with an LDC tax will
depend on the circumstances leading to their emigration and the
loyalties that they feel toward the LDC.
Even if the LDC obtains enough information13 9 to assess a PTK's
tax liability, it is still faced with the problem of collecting the tax owed.
Collection is simplified if the PTK has assets within the LDC which
can be liquidated by the tax administration and the proceeds credited
against the PTK's tax liability. If, however, the PTK has removed all
138. The administrative problems of locating a taxpayer and of verifying his income
and deductions become more difficult the longer he is outside the country. For a country
asserting citizenship jurisdiction, these administrative problems continue no matter how
long the taxpayer is abroad. A country basing jurisdiction on residence faces a less formi-
dable task, however, because a person will usually cease to be considered a resident after
he has been abroad for a prolonged period of time. See section II(C) (x) stupra.
139. In order to obtain the information necessary to assess a noncompliant PTK, the
LDC may engage in some form of unilateral action. An LDC tax administrator could, for
example, go to the DC and conduct his own investigation. This approach, however, is not
only expensive, but also one which the DC might regard as an intrusion on its national
sovereignty. Moreover, the tax administrator from the LDC would not have any special
investigatory powers in the DC, since he would be operating outside the LDC. For these
reasons, unilateral action is rarely taken unless large amounts of revenue arc involved.
Surf, supra note 137, at 182.
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of his assets before emigrating, the LDC has little recourse in obtaining
payment.
140
The LDC may be able to overcome both administrative hurdles-
obtaining accurate information about a PTK's income and collecting
any tax due-with the assistance of the host DC. The DC tax admin-
istration may already have information on the PTK's income, or, if it
does not, it can make the necessary investigation. In addition, since the
DC will have jurisdiction not only over the PTK, but also over his
assets in the DC, the DC tax administration is in a position to help
collect the LDC tax. A PTK's knowledge that the DC is cooperating
with his LDC should encourage him to comply with the LDC tax law
in the first place.
Precedent does exist for DC cooperation in the furnishing of tax
information and, to a lesser extent, in the collection of foreign taxes.
The United States, for example, will supply other countries with tax
information on individuals but not on an informal basis. It will agree
to furnish tax information only under carefully delineated conditions
contained in a tax treaty. These conditions vary from treaty to treaty.
Information that is readily available, such as a list of foreign taxpayers
receiving investment income from which United States taxes have been
40. The LDC may have to resort to nontax means of encouraging PTKs to pay the
tax. For example, a PTK might need to renew his passport or his medical or engineering
license, and the LDC could refuse to cooperate unless the PTK's tax liability had been
satisfied. Professor Bhagwati reports that the Philippines enforces its tax on nationals
abroad by refusing to renew an individual's passport unless the tax has been paid. Bhag-
wat, supra note 68. In order to obtain foreign exchange, Sri Lanka once required emi-
grants to remit a part of their earnings to a special government account. To enforce this
requirement, emigrants received passports valid only for one year. The passport would
not be renewed unless the remittances were made. 40 CEYLON NEws I (1975). Contrast
the Venezuelan use of certificates of solvency in Shoup, Due, Fitch, McDougall, Oldman &
Surrey, The Fiscal System of Venezuela, in RrAmNGs ON INCOME TAx AnmNsTATioN
(P. Kelley & 0. Oldman eds. 1973).
An LDC could attempt to collect its tax through the DC courts. The British, Canadian,
and United States courts, however, do not recognize foreign tax judgments, apparently on
the grounds that a tax is an assertion of a foreign country's sovereignty which another,
independent country should not tolerate within its borders. Another argument sometimes
advanced is that taxes are closely connected with public policy and foreign relations; by
ruling on the validity of foreign taxes, the judiciary might embarrass its own country or
the foreign country. Surr, supra note 137, at 222. For criticism of this doctrine, see Rob-
ertson, Extraterritorial Enforcement of Tax Obligations, 7 ARSi. L. REv. 219 (1966);
Stoel, The Enforcement of Foreign Non-Criminal Penal and Revenue Judgments in
England and the United States, 16 INT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 663 (1967).
The LDC could, of course, ignore the tax liability as long as the PTK were abroad, but
this approach would discourage the PTK from ever returning. Even if he were to
return, his accumulated tax bill might exceed his resources. Furthermore, a PTK might
be able to negotiate a lower tax liability in exchange for returning.
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withheld, may be routinely provided. 41 Information about a PTK's
income would ordinarily not be provided, however. In limited circum-
stances, such nonroutine information can be requested by a foreign
government,142 but the number of individuals about whom informa-
tion is actually provided is not large. The type of information which
an LDC would normally need in order to assess PTKs effectively.43
far exceeds not only current United States practice, but also that of all
other DCs.'
44
Tax treaties may also contain pledges to cooperate in the collection
of taxes.' 45 Usually, however, cooperation is limited to situations in
which a taxpayer wrongfully seeks to obtain treaty benefits
14
0 and
would therefore not extend to a PTK who refused to pay his LDC tax.
Although one recent United States treaty does provide for cooperation
under more general circumstances, 147 cases in which foreign taxes are
actually collected under such an agreement are rare.
148
141. The IRS makes little use of the routine information that it obtains from its treaty
partners. Panel Discussion, Extraterritorial Eflects o1 United States Tax Law, 12 INT'L
LAW. 581, 614 (1978) (remarks of Mr. J. Guttentag).
142. Each year, the United States receives about 15o requests for information from
foreign governments. Id. at 614-I5. "Fishing expeditions are not allowed. The foreign
government must show specifically why they need the information, why they think we
have it and that they have exhausted their attempts to get it over here, or in their home
country." Id.
143. At a minimum, the LDC would want information on the income and deductions
of any PTK who had failed to file a return. Ideally, the LDC would also want corrobora-
tive information on PTKs who had filed returns.
144. See van Hoorn, Problems, Possibilities, and Limitations with Respect to Measures
against International Tax Avoidance and Evasion, 8 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 763 (1978).
145. The United States has not, as yet, entered into collection assistance agreements
or exchange of information agreements which are not part of a more extensive tax
treaty.
146. For example, the United States-Japan income tax treaty provides that "each of
the Contracting States shall endeavor to collect such taxes imposed by the other Con-
tracting State as will ensure that any exemption or reduced rate of tax granted under
this Convention by that other Contracting State shall not be enjoyed by persons not en-
titled to such benefits." Convention on Double Taxation, Aug. 14, 1962, United States-
Japan, art. 27, z6 U.S.T. 697, T.LA.S. No. 5798. This article reflects the Treasury's
current negotiating position. See United States Model Income Tax Treaty of May 17,
1977, [1978] (CCH) Tax Treaties 11 iosg.
147. "The two Contracting States undertake to lend assistance and support to each
other in the collection of the taxes to which the present Convention refates ... in the cases
where the taxes are definitively due according to the Laws of the State making the appli-
cation." Convention on Double Taxation, July 28, 1967, United States-France, art. 27,
ig U.S.T. 528o, T.I.A.S. No. 6518.
148. IRS officials who were consulted could not remember any case in which the IRS
collected a tax on behalf of a foreign government. They stated repeatedly: "Let them fight
their own battles, we're overworked as it is." Conversations between the authors and IRS
officials, r976.
The use of collection assistance provisions is a relatively undeveloped area. Over and
above taxpayer resistance to such agreements, which is undoubtedly an obstacle to their
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The limited amount of international intergovernmental cooperation
which exists at present 49 would clearly be inadequate if more than
just a handful of PTKs failed to comply voluntarily with LDC tax
laws. Even if one DC were inclined to offer broader assistance than it
does now, it still might not be willing to do so without some assurance
that other DCs were similarly inclined. Otherwise, a DC that was
competing with other DCs for specific types of PTKs, such as doctors,
might fear that its efforts to assist the LDC would only divert immigra-
tion to those DCs which were not willing to cooperate in enforcing
the LDC tax.
5. Summary
The proposal that LDCs impose an income tax on the earnings of
emigrant PTKs is compatible with existing concepts of tax jurisdiction.
Any country is free, as a matter of international custom, to assert
jurisdiction over the worldwide income of an individual abroad pro-
vided that some minimum connection exists between the country and
the individual or the income being taxed. At present, most LDCs that
assert global jurisdiction rely on the residence of the individual as the
relevant connection. In other words, the LDC asserts jurisdiction over
the worldwide income of an individual only if he is a resident of the
LDC for tax purposes. Because emigrants do not fall within usual
definitions of residence, emigrant PTKs are not being taxed by the
LDCs at present. Mexico and the Philippines, however, assert global
jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship and are therefore able to reach
the worldwide income of emigrants who have remained citizens, if not
adoption, a number of policy questions must also be resolved. For example, under what
conditions can one country refuse to assist another in the collection of taxes? If an LDC
levies a tax only on nonresidents who are PTKs, and if a similar tax would be unconstitu-
tional if enacted by the United States, should the United States nonetheless provide col-
lection assistance to the LDC? How can an individual be protected against arbitrary con-
duct by the taxing country? The lack of agreement on these and similar issues has
hindered intergovernmental cooperation in the collection of taxes. See Johnson, Systems
for Tax Enforcement Treaties: The Choice Between Administrative Assessments and
Court Judgments, 1o HARV. INT'L L.J. 263 (1969).
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which has the responsibility of examining
proposed tax treaties, does not appear to be in favor of broader collection agreements;
the United States is therefore unlikely to enter into a treaty with broad pledges of
collection assistance. Panel Discussion, supra note 14r, at 615.
149. Some tax administrations have refused to engage in intergovernmental tax collec-
tion assistance of any kind. Surr, supra note 137, at 22o. A country that felt it would
gain very little through such cooperation would not wish to expend limited administrative
resources in collecting taxes on behalf of a foreign country.
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residents. To the extent that these countries are successful in enforcing
their claim to jurisdiction, they are already taxing the brain drain.
In a jurisdictional sense, other LDCs are free to follow Mexico and
the Philippines and assert global jurisdiction on the basis of citizen-
ship, but some of them may find enforcement an obstacle. 50 Each
LDC will have to evaluate whether or not it can successfully assert
jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship. Among the factors that the
LDC must consider are: (i) the adequacy of its tax law for application
to persons abroad; (2) the overall efficiency of its tax administration;
(3) its previous experience with taxing foreign income; (4) the condi-
tions that led to the emigration of its PTKs; (5) the expected level of
voluntary compliance by its emigrant PTKs; (6) the likelihood that its
emigrant PTKs will renounce their citizenship in order to avoid the
tax; (7) its access to assets of emigrant PTKs; and (8) the host DC's
attitude toward assisting in enforcement.
D. United Nations Taxation of Emigrant PTKs
The UNCTAD conference held in February, 1978, made it apparent
that many of the issues raised by the divergent interests of the LDCs,
DCs, and PTKs are best discussed in an international setting. More-
over, the serious problems that would be encountered in assessing and
enforcing a tax on emigrant PTKs suggest that implementation could
probably occur only under the auspices of an international organiza-
tion, such as the United Nations. Although the involvement of the
United Nations is no assurance that agreement would be reached on
the need for a tax and the form it should take, the imprimatur of the
United Nations is clearly crucial to the political and moral attractive-
ness of any proposal to tax the brain drain.' 51
The United Nations could participate in a number of ways. At the
least, it could inform the LDCs that they have the right under inter-
national law to assert tax jurisdiction over their residents and citizens
abroad. The United Nations could also sponsor research that would
distill and analyze the experience of LDCs that already assert tax
jurisdiction on the basis of citizenship, such as Mexico and the Philip-
z5o. For a brief time, Pakistan attempted to tax the foreign earnings of its nationals who
had emigrated but found that it could not enforce this broad assertion of jurisdiction.
J. BHAGWATx, supra note 71, at 40.
xss. Professor Mendlovitz perceives the involvement of the United Nations as providing
an affirmation of the interdependent nature of the global community and of the necd for
coordinated and cooperative conduct between the LDCs and the DCs. See note 1o5 supra.
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pines. Technical expertise could then be provided to individual LDCs
in order to help them overcome problems identified by this research' 52
The United Nations could also play a more active role, serving both
as a catalyst, by establishing a dialogue between the parties, and as an
intermediary, by eliminating the need for each LDC to obtain from
each host DC a commitment to assist in assessment and enforcement.
One approach would be for the United Nations to sponsor a multi-
lateral convention on the enforcement and collection of foreign taxes
which would call for greater intergovernmental cooperation. Support
for such an approach might come not only from those who are sym-
pathetic to the needs of the LDCs, but also from those who saw it as a
desirable change in international tax practice.
Certain concerns of the DCs suggest that the United Nations must
serve as more than just a catalyst if a tax on PTKs is to be implemented
effectively. The DCs will demand some guarantee that the tax will
not impose an inequitable burden on a PTK and that it will not be
administratively difficult to enforce. Also, the DCs will obviously be
unsympathetic toward participating in the enforcement of a tax on a
PTK who emigrated in order to escape religious or political oppression
or harsh social conditions. In addition, the DCs will be concerned that
adequate relief from double taxation has been provided and that the
tax is reasonable in amount and therefore unlikely to deter a PTK from
emigrating. Moreover, because of the existing competition for PTKs,
each DC will require some assurance that other DCs will conscien-
tiously enforce the tax so that it need not worry that its own enforce-
ment activities will divert PTK immigration to the other DCs. Finally,
with the active support of the United Nations, a DC need not fear the
adverse public reaction that might occur if it were to cooperate uni-
laterally with an LDC.
One way in which the United Nations could respond to these DC
concerns would be to promulgate a set of guidelines for the imposition
of LDC taxes. An LDC would have to adhere to these guidelines
before it could obtain administrative assistance from a host DC. This
approach would be feasible if guidance were limited to technical and
152. Expertise would be readily available from the United Nations Group of Experts
on Tax Treaties Between Developed and Developing Countries. This group has been meet-
ing for over so years to explore ways in which tax treaties can better accommodate the
interests of the LDCs and the DCs. It is composed of tax experts and administrators from
both groups of countries and represents a body of expertise that can be tapped for
areas other than tax treaties.
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structural issues involved in the design of a tax, because the United
Nations is capable of developing acceptable parameters for relief from
double taxation, appropriate rate schedules, and so forth. But a ticklish
problem would be encountered in dealing with the taxation of political
or religious refugees. The most obvious solution, exempting this
group from taxation, would probably be difficult to administer fairly
and effectively.15 3 Even if practical, however, such an exemption might
not satisfy those DCs which would refuse to cooperate with certain
LDCs under any conditions. For instance, it is difficult to imagine the
United States agreeing to assist in assessing or collecting a Ugandan or
a Cambodian tax on PTKs, no matter what the circumstances that led
to their emigration.
The most promising solution to this sensitive problem, as well as to
the others previously identified, is for the United Nations to design
and levy a tax and for the proceeds to be turned over to BDFs."'0 A
United Nations tax would relieve the inequities and hardships that
might result if each LDC were to levy its own tax on emigrant PTKs.
The replacement of numerous LDC taxes by a single United Nations
tax would contribute to administrative simplicity and to uniformity.
Because the collection of the tax would be under the supervision of the
United Nations, no DC need fear that other DCs would be purposely
careless in enforcing the tax in order to attract PTKs. The United
Nations is also in the best position to develop rules for taxing persons
who have renounced their citizenship.
The use of BDFs, especially if they are structured to allow for the
earmarking of revenues,"'5 should significantly increase the appeal of a
United Nations tax. A PTK should favor the use of a BDF, even if
hostility exists between him and his LDC of origin, because he could
earmark his tax revenue for use on a project or in a country of his
choice. Earmarking would also reassure the DCs that the funds they
had assisted in collecting would not go to countries with oppressive
social, religious, or political regimes, because the PTKs would not be
likely to select these countries as the beneficiaries of their tax revenue.
The remainder of this section deals with three major structural ele-
153. Perhaps the exemption could be granted, at a minimum, to refugees protected by
the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28,
i95I, 59 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 15o.
154. The United Nations does not possess the inherent power to tax individuals. In
order to implement the proposal in the text, such a power would have to be delegated
to the United Nations.
155. See section H(A) supra.
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ments involved in designing an international brain drain tax (IBDT):
(i) the class of persons subject to the tax; (2) the rules and principles
governing the calculation of a taxpayer's liability; and (3) the rate
structure.:"" The conclusion is that the optimum form of an IBDT is
a tax levied on the DC tax, that is, a surtax. The problems encountered
in administering this type of tax are considered at the end of this section.
The topics selected for treatment are by no means exhaustive. The
goal at this point in the evolution of the brain drain proposals is simply
to provide broad outlines for an IBDT and, therefore, a framework
within which debate may proceed.
i. The Taxpayer
As it was originally conceived, the proposal to tax the brain drain was
directed toward such professionals as scientists, engineers, technicians,
and doctors,.. 7 and the acronym PTK has been used to refer generally
to this group of individuals. A precise definition of PTK would be
necessary, however, in order to determine exactly which persons would
be subject to the IBDT.
Drafting a workable definition of PTK poses a challenge because of
the great variety of situations in which an individual from an LDC
will be present in a DC. Some come on short business trips, others
come to teach for a year or more, and still others come initially as
students and remain after completing their education. Skills and jobs
also vary tremendously. Since many professionals will have consider-
able flexibility in describing their skills, jobs, or reasons for being in the
DC, the adoption of a precise definition of PTK will create the admin-
istrative burden of drawing fine distinctions among potential taxpayers
and invite maneuvers to circumvent the definition. Furthermore, the
nature of an individual's employment, as well as his reasons for being
in the DC, may vary from year to year. Determining his status only at
the time of immigration would therefore not be sufficient; his status
would have to be scrutinized afresh each year.
These definitional problems can be avoided by taxing all LDC
citizens present in the DC. 5 s In some cases, little difference may exist
156. These issues are inherent in the design of any tax and thus mirror some of the
issues discussed in section H(C) supra.
157. Bhagwati & Dellalfar, supra note 9, at 33.
i58. These definitional problems would also be encountered by an LDC that extended
its tax to emigrant PTKs, see section II(C) supra, and the discussion in the text is equally
relevant to this situation.
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between levying an IBDT on all of an LDC's citizens who are abroad
and levying one only on an LDC's emigrant PTKs. For example, the
brain drain experienced by some LDCs consists primarily of doctors or
scientists -professionals who would obviously be included in any
definition of PTK. Other LDCs, however, may experience a migration
of rentiers and businessmen or of persons employed by international
agencies and multinational corporations. These individuals are not
normally thought of as PTKs, but their emigration does result in a
loss by the LDC of managerial, leadership, or entrepreneurial abilities.
In view of the rationale for taxing the brain drain and the administra-
tive considerations in favor of applying an IBDT on the basis of citizen-
ship, little reason exists for limiting the tax to PTKs."'
Levying an IBDT on all LDC citizens abroad, rather than just on
emigrant PTKs, would increase the number of taxpayers, and such a
tax could therefore be levied at a lower rate and raise the same amount
of revenue. Keeping the rate low has four advantages: (i) tax avoid-
ance and evasion would be reduced; (2) the tax would be less likely
to affect an individual's decision to emigrate; (3) inequities and hard-
ship would be reduced; and (4) the problem of double taxation would
be less severe.
One objection that might be raised to imposing an IBDT on all
LDC citizens abroad is that it would apply not only to the brain drain,
but also to the "muscle drain" - that is, to the unskilled or semi-skilled
individuals who are euphemistically referred to in Europe as "guest-
workers." 16 0 Any attempt to exempt the muscle drain from the IBDT
by adopting a functional definition would raise many of the same
problems discussed in defining PTK. The muscle drain could be
excluded, however, by levying the IBDT only on income above a
certain level. For any country in which members of the brain drain are
more highly paid than members of the muscle drain, this approach
should be effective in distinguishing between the two groups. A differ-
ent minimum income level could be set for each DC to take account of
prevailing salary differentials.
A final problem is whether an emigrant's renunciation of LDC
i59. Although levying the IBDT on all LDC nationals would be preferable, at times
the term PTK will be used as shorthand to refer to those individuals who would be
subject to the tax.
x6o. For a discussion of the muscle drain, see Ecevit & Zachariah, supra note 8. Al-
though the muscle drain has become associated with the emigration of labor from the
Mediterranean countries to Europe, the migration of semi-skilled manpower has been
traditional in Africa and elsewhere. H. SINGER & J. ANsARu, supra note 83, at 222-23.
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citizenship should be recognized in applying an IBDT. Although the
United Nations is in a better position than the LDCs to develop rules
for dealing with the possibility of renunciation which are acceptable
to the international community,10 1 the solution seems to be the same
in both cases: a time limitation on the imposition of the tax. This
approach would reduce the tax incentive to renounce. Moreover, once a
PTK has been abroad for a substantial period of time, the justice of
continuing to subject him to the IBDT is questionable, even if he does
not renounce his citizenship. Therefore, except for the revenue loss, lim-
iting a person's liability to, say, five years, or perhaps fewer appears
to be desirable regardless of the renunciation problem. A five-year
limit on taxation would also make it more acceptable to disregard any
renunciation that might occur within the period' 6
2. The Tax Base
Once the group of persons subject to the IBDT is selected, the next
task is to define the tax base - that is, the amount of income that will
be subject to this tax. Two major choices are available: the host DC's
tax base or a specially designed tax base.
Administrative considerations favor the adoption of the host DC's
tax base. With the exception of employees of international organiza-
tions, most PTKs would presumably be paying DC taxes and would
have to compute their DC taxable income anyway. Using this taxable
income as the base for the IBDT would therefore impose little addi-
tional administrative burden on the PTK. Moreover, using the DC tax
base would reduce the need for the United Nations to create an
elaborate new bureaucracy to enforce the tax. If the IBDT were levied
x61. See section II(C) (i) supra.
162. A time limit would reduce the number of idiosyncratic situations in which the
imposition of a tax might be perceived as unfair. For example, the tax would be unfair
to a person who was an LDC national only because his DC parents had been temporarily
resident in the LDC at the time of his birth. Similarly, the tax might be unfair to an
LDC national who grew up in a DC because his LDC parents had emigrated to the
DC shortly after his birth. In each case, the LDC national's five-year period of exposure to
the IBDT would expire before he had any earned income. Thus, a time limit on the tax,
in conjunction with the use of BDFs, see section 1(A) supra, would seem to reduce the
unfairness in the situations posited by Professor Partington. See Partington, The Brain
Drain Tax Proposal: A Lawyer's Analysis, in VOL. I, supra note 2, at I5, 146-47.
A ceiling could also be imposed on the aggregate amount of tax paid by a PTK. This
ceiling could be determined separately for each PTK, perhaps as a function of the amount
of education he had received at LDC expense. The PTK's liability for the IBDT would
be extinguished either as soon as his five-year period had expired or as soon as his ceiling
had been reached.
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on DC taxable income, the DC tax administration's normal audit and
administrative activities, though directed at enforcing the DC tax,
would automatically be enlisted on behalf of the IBDT. In addition,
any controversy over the amount of a PTK's taxable income for pur-
poses of the DC tax would be resolved through the DC's normal
appellate procedures. In most cases, the DC's self-interest in safeguard-
ing the integrity of its own tax would eliminate the need for special
IBDT enforcement machinery.
The employees of international organizations pose a special problem.
Because the earned income of these employees is generally exempt
from DC taxation,163 many of them do not ordinarily compute their
DC taxable income. These employees could, of course, be required to
compute their income for purposes of the IBDT as if they were taxable
under DC law.164 Special arrangements would have to be made, how-
ever, for ensuring that these computations were accurate because they
would not be verified by the DC tax administration.
The rules for calculating taxable income obviously vary from one
DC to another. Because of these differences in DC tax laws, PTKs
who have the same economic income, after adjustment for differences
in purchasing power, may have very different amounts of DC taxable
income. The adoption of DC taxable income as the base for the IBDT
would therefore require PTKs who have identical amounts of economic
income to pay different amounts of IBDT. The question therefore
arises whether certain provisions of DC tax law could or should be
ignored in determining a PTK's liability for the tax. The answer
depends on the nature and extent of the provisions in each DC's tax
law. No doubt, certain alterations in DC taxable income could be made
with little effort. For example, a PTK in the United States could
easily add the nontaxable portion of his capital gains"' to his United
States taxable income to obtain a truer measure of his economic income.
Other adjustments, however, such as those which would be necessary
to offset the use of tax shelters and the availability of sophisticated tax
avoidance arrangements, might be too complicated to be practical.
Instead of using the DC tax base as its starting point, the United
Nations could define a completely independent tax base for the IBDT.
163. See section lI(B) supra.
164. Those employees who are required to file a DC tax return because they have un-
earned income that is taxable by the DC could, for purposes of the IBDT, amend this
return to reflect their tax-exempt earned income.
165. I.R.C. S 1202.
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A specially designed base, one not dependent on DC tax laws, would
ensure that PTKs having the same economic income would have the
same amount of IBDT income, regardless of where they were working
or living, or for whomever they were working.
Whatever the merits of designing a special IBDT base, ease of imple-
mentation is not one of them. First, the United Nations would be
required to resolve a host of both substantive and technical issues1 66
In effect, the United Nations would have to sit as an international tax
reform commission in order to determine in detail the appropriate
treatment of capital gains, business deductions, inheritances, and so
forth. Even if an adequate set of rules were to be developed, serious
administrative problems would then be encountered. No country or
group of persons would have any experience with the new IBDT
rules, and some means of educating taxpayers, accountants, and lawyers
would have to be developed. An even more serious problem, however, is
that a DC tax administration would no longer enforce the IBDT base
automatically, as part of its normal domestic activities. Instead, an or-
ganization with IBDT expertise would have to be created to answer
taxpayer questions, to perform audit, intelligence, and collection func-
tions, and to provide some type of appellate procedure.
The problems of designing and implementing a special tax base are
substantial, but not insurmountable. Similar problems are faced by
any country that introduces an income tax for the first time. As a prac-
tical matter, however, support for this tax will depend on how easily
it could be implemented without seriously disrupting existing practices.
The specter of a new international bureaucracy, which would probably
be required if a special IBDT tax base were adopted, would dampen
enthusiasm for the tax. For these reasons, DC taxable income emerges
as the logical choice of tax base for this tax. Adjustments to this base
can be made country by country, and, to this extent, some of the bene-
fits of a specially designed tax base would be realized.
3. The Rate Structure
The final step in calculating the IBDT liability of a PTK is to apply
some tax rate to his taxable income. Again, two major alternatives are
available: (i) the use of a specially designed rate schedule, applicable
166. For a discussion of the similar problems encountered by an LDC in extending its
tax base to individuals abroad, see section H1(C) (2) supra.
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uniformly to all taxpayers, or (2) the adoption of the host DC's rate
schedule.'
67
The choice of an IBDT rate schedule is closely linked to the choice
of an appropriate tax base. If a specially designed IBDT base were used
in order to ensure the uniform treatment of all PTKs, then a special
IBDT rate schedule would also have to be designed. In other words,
if uniformity is the goal, then PTKs having identical IBDT income
must pay the same amount of tax, and satisfying this goal would
require not only an independent tax base, but also an independent rate
schedule. Indeed, the effort involved in designing a special tax base
would be lost unless a special rate schedule were applied. For the
same reasons, if DC taxable income were used as the IBDT tax base,
a specially designed rate schedule would not produce uniformity. That
is, the rationale behind applying the same, specially designed rate sched-
ule to all PTKs would vanish if the IBDT tax base were not uniform.
If DC taxable income were used as the IBDT tax base, the IBDT
rates could be a certain percentage of the DC tax rates, say 5%. In other
words, the rate would be equal to 5% of whatever DC tax rate were
applicable to the PTK. This approach is the same as levying a 5%
surtax, that is, a 5% tax levied on the DC tax. In order to calculate his
IBDT liability, a PTK would compute his DC tax base under the
DC's regular rules, apply the DC's regular rate schedule, and multiply
his DC tax liability by 5%.
Although other ways of relating the IBDT rates to the DC rates
obviously exist, the surtax approach has a number of desirable charac-
teristics. First, the surtax automatically relates the additional IBDT
burden to the DC tax. Presumably, the DC tax base and rate structure
produce a tax burden that is regarded as fair and equitable in terms of
conditions in the DC; a modest surtax would therefore ensure that the
additional burden was reasonable. A 5% surtax, for example, would
be unlikely to deter immigration to the DC or to result in wholesale
renunciations of LDC citizenship. Second, because the mechanics of a
167. For a theoretical discussion of how a tax rate might be chosen in order to
minimize an LDC's loss from the brain drain, or to maximize the revenue potential of
the tax, see Bhagwati, supra note 9, at 24-25. The rates of tax suggested by this theoretical
discussion could, however, generate a tax burden on the PTK which far exceeded the
tax burden on non-PTKs at the same income level. Because the fairness, and thus the polit-
ical attractiveness, of the IBDT is likely to be judged in part by comparing the tax burden
on a PTK with the burden on non-PTKs, the only realistic choice is a rate of tax which
produces a burden on the PTK which is not greatly out of line with the burden on non-
PTKs, even though a higher rate might produce more IBDT revenue.
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surtax are easily understood, little confusion should accompany debate
over this version of an IBDT. The additional tax burden of the IBDT
at any income level in any DC could be calculated easily, and fears of
undue hardship would be dispelled.' 8 A third advantage of the surtax
approach is that the burden of double taxation is minimal and resort
to a special relief mechanism, such as a foreign tax credit, 69 is therefore
unnecessary.
The surtax approach assumes that the IBDT liability will be a func-
tion of the DC tax base. A special rate schedule could be designed, how-
ever, if the IBDT were levied on an independent tax base. Although
the use of an independent IBDT tax base does not seem feasible in the
short term, it might be helpful to sketch two of the options available
in designing a special rate schedule.
To begin with, consider two PTKs, one working in the United
States and the other working in the United Kingdom. The United
Kingdom PTK pays a United Kingdom income tax equivalent to
$8,ooo, and the United States PTK pays a United States income tax
of $4,000. Assume that both PTKs have the same taxable income for
purposes of the IBDT (although their DC taxable incomes may be
very different).
Under the first option, the IBDT rates would be designed so that,
at any level of IBDT taxable income, the tax would be substantially
lower than either the United States or the United Kingdom tax. For
the PTKs under consideration, the IBDT tax rate might be designed
to produce a $200 tax. Although each PTK would pay the $200 in
addition to his regular United States or United Kingdom income tax,
the IBDT burden would not be substantial, and the problem of double
taxation could be ignored.
Both PTKs have the same amount of IBDT taxable income and
would therefore pay identical amounts of IBDT. As a percentage of
the DC tax liability, however, the additional burden of the IBDT
would be heavier for the PTK in the United States. His additional
IBDT burden would be equivalent to a 5% surtax, whereas the addi-
x68. Demands for progressivity would be satisfied since an IBDT surtax would reflect
the progressivity of the DC tax rates. If, however, progressivity were not essential, the tax
could be a fixed percentage of income. The administrative considerations, discussed in
section 1(D)(4) infra, would be generally applicable to a fiat-rate tax, as well as to a
surtax.
169. See section 11(C) (3) supra.
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tional IBDT on the PTK in the United Kingdom would be equivalent
to a 2.5% surtax.
Under the second option, the IBDT rates would be set so that this
tax would be greater than the United States income tax but less than
the United Kingdom income tax. Assume that the IBDT rates were
designed to generate a tax of $4,500 for the two PTKs under consider-
ation. Although the additional IBDT burden under the first option
was modest, and lower than either the United States or the United
Kingdom tax, the IBDT liability under the second option would be
substantial and therefore would require that some relief mechanism be
provided. The United States and the United Kingdom could, for
example, allow the PTKs to credit the IBDT of $4,50o against their
respective income taxes.' 70 The credit granted to the PTK in the
United States would exceed his United States tax liability of $4,000,
and he would owe no tax to the United States. The credit allowed the
PTK in the United Kingdom would be less than his United Kingdom
liability, and his net United Kingdom tax liability would be $3,500, or
the difference between his before-credit United Kingdom tax and the
IBDT ($8,ooo- $4,500).
The second option would generate more revenue than the first. The
level of revenue would be higher because of the credits provided by
the United Kingdom and the United States, which would forgo all or
a part of the tax they would otherwise collect: $4,500 and $4,000,
respectively.M  The revenue potential of this second approach has its
limits, however. As a practical matter, the IBDT tax liability could not
be too much higher than the United States liability without the total
burden on the United States PTK becoming excessive, even with the
credit.
Although the second option has a greater revenue potential than the
first option, it may be perceived as unfair because it would impose an
additional burden only on the PTK in the United States. He would
experience a $500 increase in his overall burden, but the PTK in the
170. The granting of a credit for the IBDT, which was levied on income having its
source within the United Kingdom or the United States, would be contrary to either
country's current practice. See note 132 supra.
171. Because the amount of revenue forgone can be viewed as a form of foreign aid,
see note 132 supra, an objection can be made to the difference in amounts that the United
Kingdom and the United States "contribute" ($4,500 versus $4,000). This difference
could be eliminated, however, if the amount of revenue given up by granting a credit for
the IBDT were allowed as an offset against each country's United Nations assessment on
host DCs, discussed in section II(E) infra.
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United Irngdom would have the same overall tax burden, $8,ooo, with
or without the IBDT. The dilemma presented by the second option is
that the combination of a DC credit and a high IBDT liability would
have a great revenue potential, but it would leave some PTKs totally
unaffected by the IBDT. In other words, any PTK whose before-credit
DC liability exceeded his IBDT liability would not bear any increase
in overall tax burden as a result of the IBDT. Some persons would
find this result acceptable, because those PTKs who were not affected
by the IBDT would, after all, be those who already had the highest
DC tax liabilities, but any DC whose PTKs would bear a higher
burden because of the IBDT might be concerned that the IBDT would
divert immigration to other DCs.
4. Administrative Considerations
At first glance, an IBDT levied as a surtax on the DC tax appears
easy to implement; no more would seem to be involved than adding a
line to the DC tax return."' This simplicity is superficial, however,
because the application of a surtax to a select group of DC taxpayers,
rather than to all DC taxpayers, would be equivalent in many respects
to the adoption of an entirely separate tax. Each DC tax administration
would be required (i) to modify its tax forms or prepare special forms;
(2) to update its roll of persons subject to the tax or compile a new
roll; (3) to design special withholding tables and instructions; (4) to
develop or modify current payment programs for the self-employed
and other taxpayers not subject to withholding; (5) to plan or expand
taxpayer information efforts, such as descriptive pamphlets and mass
education programs about filing requirements; (6) to write new regu-
lations and rulings interpreting the statute; and (7) to train officials to
answer questions from taxpayers and to deal with disputes on appeal.
Most of these administrative tasks are manageable but must be thought
through in a new context.
For example, consider the need to establish and maintain the tax
roll. Both the DC tax administration and the withholding agents or
other payors must have some means of easily identifying individuals
subject to the IBDT. It is unrealistic to expect PTKs to volunteer
information about their status or to expect employers to make the
necessary inquiries unless sanctions exist for their failure to do so.
,72. Bhagwati, The Brain Drain Tax Proposal and the Issues, in VOL. I, supra note 2,
at 24.
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One way of building up the tax roll would be through information
provided by immigration authorities. If the IBDT were levied on all
LDC nationals, for example, the immigration bureau could, without
great difficulty, generate a list of newly entering individuals subject to
the tax. If, however, the IBDT were levied only on certain categories
of LDC professionals, rather than all LDC nationals, the immigration
bureau would face the far more difficult task of verifying the profes-
sional status of each immigrant. In addition, obtaining information
about individuals who immigrated before the introduction of the IBDT
would be troublesome because the data in the files of the immigration
bureau would probably not be up-to-date or organized in a readily
usable manner. Although some information might be gathered if
aliens were required to register annually, it would probably not be as
accurate or reliable as the information obtainable for new immigrants.
The question therefore arises whether the IBDT should be applied to all
PTKs, and the likelihood of evasion by -those already in the country
ignored, or whether it should be applied only prospectively, that is, to
new immigrants.
Information compiled by the immigration authorities could be trans-
mitted to the tax administration. Computerization of this information
seems essential but would require that a taxpayer identification number
be assigned to each PTK at the time of immigration. Without identifica-
tion numbers, correlating the information from the immigration bureau
with the tax returns being filed would be nearly impossible. Assigning
a taxpayer identification number to an immigrant at some point after
arrival would be possible only if aliens were required to register annually.
Once PTKs were identified, the tax administration could send each
of them information on his special tax obligations, including, perhaps,
his duty to inform his employer of his status for withholding purposes.
The PTK's failure to inform his employer would be detected by the
computer at the time of filing and could result in the delinquent PTK's
being subject to fines or other penalties. An alternative, possible in some
countries, is for the tax administration to notify employers directly of
the PTK's status.
This brief description of just one aspect of the administrative prob-
lems indicates that an IBDT, even if levied in its simplest form, a surtax,
would require numerous changes in DC practices 78 These changes in
173. As explained in note 3 supra, a brain drain can occur between two LDCs, as well
as from an LDC to a DC. The arguments that underlie the IBDT suggest that an emi-
grant PTK should be taxed whether his country of immigration is a DC or an LDC. The
administrative considerations discussed in the text, however, raise doubts about the ability
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procedure would be both costly and time-consuming and would there-
fore require a serious commitment on the part of the DCs' 4
E. A United Nations Assessment on Host DCs
The reaction of the DC participants at the UNCTAD conference sug-
gests that a lengthy period will be required before DC support for a tax
on emigrant PTKs can be expected. Certainly, in the short term, the
justice of a tax on PTKs will remain controversial, even if its proceeds
are used to finance BDFs. At the Bellagio conference, the authors pro-
posed that, instead of a tax on PTKs, an assessment on the host DCs
could be levied by the United Nations, in recognition of the benefits that
accrue to them from PTK immigration. Because most students of the
brain drain readily concede that the DCs are enriched by the immi-
gration of PTKs, such an assessment should be less controversial than
a tax on emigrants. Moreover, in contrast to a tax, a United Nations
assessment on host DCs will not affect a PTK's decision to emigrate." 5
The amount of the United Nations assessment on a host DC could
be determined in a number of ways but should be related to the bene-
fits accruing to the DC. Measuring the actual benefits would not be
practical because they are diffused and not easy to quantify; the neces-
sary analytical tools do not exist. A more practical approach would be
for economists to attempt to identify easier-to-measure factors that are
an indication of the benefits accruing to a host DC and, then, to develop
a formula incorporating these factors. Among the factors the economists
might consider are the amount of income earned by PTKs within a DC,
the amount of tax paid by PTKs to the DC, the relative scarcity of a
of an LDC, which served as a host country, to implement the procedures necessary to en-
force the tax. First, a host LDC may not have an income tax. Without an income tax, the
IBDT could not be levied in the form of a surtax or in any manner that was dependent on
the existence of an income tax base. Many of the OPEC countries, which attract PTKs,
do not have an income tax, or exempt salaries and wages earned by foreigners, or exempt
foreign "experts" from tax. INxuTaAToNAL. Buau OF FIscAL DOCUMENTATION, TAXMs AND
INVEsTMENT IN THM MIDDLE EAST (1977). Second, even if the host LDC has an income
tax, enforcement of the tax may be so haphazard and so ineffective that little possibility
exists that the LDC would be able to administer an additional tax, such as the IBDT.
Third, a host LDC might not want to enforce the IBDT for fear of discouraging immigra-
tion. Fourth, the amount of IBDT revenue involved may not justify a host LDC's revamp-
ing its administrative machinery to implement the tax, even if such changes were feasible.
174. A DC would be unlikely to make this commitment to each LDC that unilaterally
levied a tax on emigrant PTKs, even if that tax were imposed as a surtax to the DC
tax. See notes 126 & 136 supra.
x75. A PTK's decision to emigrate will not be affected because the assessment is paid
by the host DC. The PTK's ability to enter a DC could be affected, however, if DCs
tightened their immigration restrictions in order to reduce the amount of their United
Nations assessments.
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PTK's skills in the DC, the level of education attained by a PTK
before entering the DC, and so forth.
76
The administrative problems that would be encountered in adopting a
formulary approach to a United Nations assessment are less formidable
than those encountered in levying a tax on individual PTKs. For
example, a formula based on the amount of income earned by all PTKs
within a DC would require only aggregate income data, rather than
specific data from each PTK. The information necessary to compute the
assessment could therefore be obtained through sample surveys and
cross-sectional studies.'77 Some studies of this sort have already been
made by economists investigating the brain drain. Updating these
studies periodically would be far easier than levying and collecting a
tax annually from PTKs, even if the formula for the United Nations
assessment incorporated variables in addition to income.'O 8
III. CONCLUSION
The DCs and the LDCs differ widely in their opinions on the costs and
benefits of the brain drain. So far, they have been unable by themselves
to establish areas of agreement which could become the foundation for
fruitful discussion of their differences. Lacking this foundation, the DCs
and the LDCs have tended to dwell on their antagonisms and to dismiss
each other's views of the brain drain as unfounded, misconceived, or
self-serving.
Until more of a consensus can be reached, it is unrealistic to expect
the DCs to embrace any of the proposals presented at the recent
UNCTAD meeting. This meeting was, however, a significant step
,76. The assessment could be reduced to reflect any technical assistance programs,
foreign aid, or other similar transfers of resources from a DC to any of the LDCs. See
notes 99 & 171 supra. If an offset were not allowed for these transfers to the LDCs, a DC
might simply reduce the amount of its existing foreign aid by the amount of its United
Nations assessment. If this reduction took place, the amount of revenues flowing to the
LDCs would not change in the aggregate, but the revenues would now be transferred
through the United Nations or BDFs, rather than to the LDCs directly.
177. Since the administrative problems of implementing an assessment on a country are
less severe than those of imposing a tax on individuals, a United Nations assessment could
conceivably be extended to LDCs that were attracting PTK emigrants from other countries.
An adjustment in the assessment on such an LDC could be made to reflect any loss
suffered by the LDC through the emigration of its own PTKs.
178. Any host DC is obviously free to adopt a foreign aid program based on these
principles without the participation of other DCs or the United Nations. For example, this
unilateral approach would recognize the large flow of PTKs to the United Kingdom or to
France from a former colony, or between various contiguous countries. The United Na-
tions could, of course, encourage such a program through a combination of technical
assistance, statistical information, and moral suasion.
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toward developing that consensus. In the context of a specific set of
proposals, the DCs and the LDCs were able to place their rhetoric and
hyperbole aside and to gain an understanding and appreciation of the
fundamental moral, economic, and cultural differences that shape each
other's perceptions of the brain drain. The conference thus established a
new dialogue between the parties.
This dialogue, as well as the discussion and analysis in this article,
has centered on Professor Bhagwati's proposal to levy a tax on emi-
grant PTKs. His proposal has led the DCs and the LDCs to reconsider
the entire brain drain problem and has provided a fresh perspective on
the underlying issues. In order to nurture this dialogue, UNCTAD
should consider focusing on those proposals which are the least con-
troversial and which are the easiest to implement. This narrower orien-
tation would appear to eliminate a tax on emigrant PTKs from
consideration, at least in the short term. Not only would such a tax
require numerous changes in existing administrative practices, but its
justice and fairness will be strongly challenged by the DCs and the
PTKs. In the view of the authors, however, a United Nations assess-
ment on host DCs and tax incentives for voluntary contributions to
BDFs merit further inquiry. Neither of these proposals has received the
same consideration as has the taxation of emigrant PTKs, even though
both are less controversial and easier to implement.
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